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The Kickapoos are an Algonquian tribe that historically resided in the western Great 
Lakes region.  Their early interactions with Europeans required political adaptations to 
secure their territorial sovereignty and growth.  From 1650 to 1763 French explorers, 
traders and Jesuits entrenched themselves in the Kickapoos homelands south of Lake 
Michigan.  Kickapoo treatment of these intruders progressed from indifferent interaction 
to opposition, cooperation, and then detachment during the French and Indian War.  As 
Spanish and later British agents likewise penetrated up the Mississippi and west of the 
Ohio, respectively, Kickapoos exploited the competing European nations that vied for 
their fidelity.  While pledging hollow promises of loyalty to French, Spanish, and British 
authorities, the tribe violently raided and expelled uninvited agents, military parties, and 
traders.  With the exception of a few disastrous raids that ravished the Kickapoos, the 
tribe successfully repelled European authorities and profited from their relationships.  
Kickapoos simultaneously overran smaller Wabash and Illinois River Valley tribes, 
extending their own territorial sovereignty.  Though the Kickapoo diplomatic system 
benefited during the American Revolution, it declined and failed thereafter as the United 
  
States Army and infringing settlers flooded the Old Northwest.  The Louisiana Purchase 
and then the War of 1812 definitively expelled the Kickapoos’ previous European 
benefactors.  Surrounded by Euro-American settlers and subjugated by the U.S. army, in 
1819 the Kickapoos submitted to multiple treaties stripping them of their land and 
relations with other nations.  Facing the failure of the diplomatic system that once 
preserved their territorial dominance, Kickapoos splintered across the present-day 
American states of Missouri, Oklahoma, Kansas, Texas, and Coahuila in Mexico.     
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Preface 
 
Given the many participants, changing identities, and mixed-affiliations involved 
in North America’s history, it becomes necessary to define a few terms.  The first of these 
are geographical.  The region surrounding the Great Lakes is most commonly referred to 
as the Old Northwest.  It also carries a temporal connotation of the late colonial era and 
early years of the United States, the region legally delineated as the Northwest Territory 
from 1787 until 1803 when the remnants of the region became the state of Ohio and other 
territories including Indiana, Michigan, and Illinois, followed by statehoods.  In this 
thesis when events occur throughout the Great Lakes region, across territorial boundaries, 
or before the organization of the United Stages, the popular vernacular “Old Northwest” 
is generally employed, though at times regions are identified by their “present-day” 
designations.  After the organization of the United States, the exact territory or state name 
is used.  Additionally, the term “backcountry” is occasionally applied with the intention 
of depicting the interior frontier west region that is just east of the Mississippi and 
stretches liberally north and south from the Great Lakes to the present-day states of 
Alabama and Mississippi.  
 The second field of potentially enigmatic terminology lies in reference to various 
peoples.  Individuals from or acting on behalf of France or Spain are easily enough 
referred to as French and Spanish.  To keep things simple, individuals from or acting on 
behalf of England or the United Kingdom are referred to as British, except where 
quotations dictate otherwise.  While the United Kingdom of Great Britain was not 
technically established until 1707, and thereafter the name changes slightly as different 
peoples are incorporated, it becomes unnecessarily tedious and distracting to refer to 
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individuals as English, Scottish, Welch, and yet British at other times.  Furthermore, this 
distinction is not significantly relevant to the question of Kickapoo diplomacy.  Upon 
winning independence, formerly “British” turned United States citizens are uniformly 
termed Euro-American to differentiate them from Native Americans.  While the term 
Native American is at times necessary to reference Indians from multiple or unknown 
tribes, the specific tribal affiliation is preferred and employed whenever possible.  That 
said, the various tribes that constitute the Iroquois nation are generally spoken of by their 
confederate titled—the Iroquois.1  Similarly, the Dakotas, Nakotas, and Lakotas are 
simply termed Sioux.  In both these cases, there is no need and often insufficient 
evidence to specify exactly which band or tribe is involved when examining the 
Kickapoos.   
 The final point of clarification is centered in the documents themselves.  The bulk 
of primary sources cited herein are referenced from the Jesuit Relations and from 
miscellaneous collections assembled in the Ohio Valley Great Lakes Ethnohistory 
Archive in Bloomington, Indiana.  In quoting from these documents, all efforts have been 
made to retain the original grammar and spelling, except for tribe names which have been 
standardized.  In various records many tribes are referred to by different names and with 
different spellings.  Much of this is due to the inclusion of French, Spanish, British and 
Euro-American documents.  Rather than inundate the reader with dozens of spellings and 
alternate names applied to the Kickapoos, as well as other tribes, all tribal names have 
                                                 
1 It is worth noting that the title Iroquois is the popular vernacular term applied to 
the tribal alliance of Iroquoian speaking nations who call themselves Haudenosaunee. 
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been standardized, whether in quotations or not.2  Finally, the nature of the documents 
leaves much to be desired by way of class and gender.  Few records reveal class 
distinctions and gender roles among the Kickapoos who were generally reclusive in 
nature.  This is not to say significant events and adaptations did not occur along class and 
gender lines, but only that the documents are silent to such.  All effort has been made to 
accurately and respectfully represent the Kickapoos and those with whom they interact. 
 
 
                                                 
2 Alternate and misprinted spellings of Kickapoos, as listed by Frederick Webb 
Hodge, The Handbook of American Indians North of Mexico (Smithsonian Institution, 
Bureau of American Ethnology Bulletin 30. GPO: 1910), include: A/-uyaX, Gîgabu 
(plural Gígabuhak), Gikapu, Gokapatagans, Hígabu, Hika/pu, I/-ka-du / , Kackapoes, 
Kecapos, Ke-ga-boge, Kehabous, Kekapos, Kekapou, Kekaupoag, Kicapoos, Kicapous, 
Kicapoux, Kicapus, Kiccapoos, Kichapacs, Kickapoos, Kickapos, Kickapous, Kickipoo, 
Kicoagoves, Kicoapous, Kicopoux, Kikabeux, Kikabons, Kikabou, KiKaboua, Kikábu, 
Kikapaus, Kikapoes, Kikapoos, Kikapous, Kikap8s, Kikapoux, Kikapouz, Kikapu, 
Kikapus, Kikkapoos, Kikpouz, Kispapous, Qnicapous, Quicapause, Quicapons, 
Quicapous, Quinaquois, Quincapous, Ricapous, Rickapoos, Shack-a-po, Shake-kah-quah, 
Shígapo, Shikapu, Sik/ -a-pu, Tékapu, Yuntara /ye-ru/nu.  
Introduction 
 
Indigenous peoples rallied together and rivaled one another long before 
Europeans set foot on the American continent.  Like other societies, Native American 
diplomacy consisted of negotiation, trade, appeasement, and conflict.  Each tribe 
developed strategic methods to interrelate with those around them.  Ultimately they acted 
to serve their own interests.  In order to understand Native American people, 
ethnohistorians must inquire how individual nations organized themselves to face the 
changing world around them.  They examine the development of diplomatic institutions; 
how adaptations in the evolving political climate compare to traditional systems of 
conflict management; and the success of these mechanisms.  The purpose of this thesis is 
to trace Kickapoo diplomatic behavior, examining how the nation developed dynamic 
means of self preservation and territorial dominance in the face of encroaching Europeans 
from the late seventeenth to the early nineteenth centuries. 
The arrival of Europeans ushered in new alliances and conflicts.  When the 
Spanish moved from the Caribbean to overrun present-day southern Mexico in 1519 they 
were led by Indian allies anxious to depose the Aztec overlords.  French and Dutch 
settlements in the Northeast gathered Iroquois and Wyandotte neighbors, respectively, all 
parties joining in trade, war and cultural exchange.  Further south along the Atlantic 
seaboard, the Powhatan confederacy initially welcomed Jamestown colonists and 
attempted to incorporate them into the local intertribal federation.  Following the death of 
Chief Powhatan and the succession of his brother, Opechancanough, the encroaching 
British violently competed with neighboring Indians.  Each of these European-Indian 
relationships was uniquely complex, but nevertheless entailed similar themes of trade, 
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cooperation, and conflict.  Often an initially cooperative atmosphere deteriorated into 
overtly violent conflicts and even wide-spread war.  In general, European rivalries 
exacerbated and realigned preexisting Indian competitions and hostilities.  Motivated by 
self-interests, Indians and Europeans developed dynamic strategies in the drastically 
changing geo-political environment.  As European explorations pierced farther into the 
northeastern interior, each interior tribe likewise faced radical transformations introduced 
by the foreigners’ arrivals.  
Regardless of their strategies, tribes adjacent to European settlements found it 
difficult to resist the political, military, and cultural expansion of the newcomers.  Many 
Indians suffered disease, military defeat, and dispossession.  Social anomie, a clinical 
term denoting widespread and excessive anxiety spawned by sudden invalidation of 
cultural norms, desperately threatened cultural stability.  Those tribes located deeper in 
the interior initially enjoyed greater independence to negotiate with Europeans on their 
own terms.  These Indians were not as susceptible to invasion, less dependent on trade, 
and their traditional culture less directly challenged.  Still the Europeans continued 
westward and eventually all Native Americans faced the changing realities of the 
advancing intruders. 
Located deep in the Northeastern woodlands region, the Kickapoos did not suffer 
the immediate and complete impact experienced by the Wyandottes, Iroquois, Powhatans 
and smaller eastern tribes; however, by the mid-seventeenth century Frenchmen (and 
later the Spanish and British) infiltrated the Kickapoos’ homelands in present-day 
Wisconsin, Illinois, and Indiana.  The tribe’s success and survival depended upon their 
ability to reconcile the rapidly changing political environment.  In present-day Illinois 
 3
small bands typically functioned as semi-autonomous units, only inconsistently working 
in cooperation with their larger tribe—a concept better reflected by the unity of 
neighboring nations such as the Sioux and Iroquois.  Kickapoos maneuvered to negotiate 
a world of transforming diplomatic realities, particularly as French imperial power 
superseded their own in the Illinois River region.  Attempting to manage the intruding 
French as well as extend their dominance over the small bands and tribes in the region, 
Kickapoo diplomatic strategies underwent a series of adaptations, culminating in a policy 
of diplomatic exploitation.  As the British and Spanish expanded into the region, 
Kickapoos continued to extract goods and services from Europeans in exchange for the 
tribe’s self-serving promises of loyalty.  Kickapoos influenced European powers, 
employing force, alliance brokering, trade, appeasement, and deceit.  Indeed, the arrival 
of the Europeans inaugurated an era of Kickapoo empowerment founded upon foreign 
manipulation.  This diplomacy climaxed in the mid to late eighteenth century as British, 
French, and Spanish traders competed to entreat the tribe. 
 The Kickapoos’ diplomatic strategies remained effective as long as European 
nations vied for their support and no foreign power could exclusively control the 
Kickapoos’ homelands southwest of Lake Michigan.  In fact, until the ascension of the 
United States and its westward colonization, Kickapoos remained the most powerful 
force in the region.  There the tribe pillaged traders while restraining European authorities 
through insincerely pledged allegiances.  European fears of loosing all control of the 
region and the hope of winning the tribe’s fidelity was enough to extract support from 
France, Spain, and Britain, despite the Kickapoos generally hostile attitude toward 
uninvited explorers, traders, and adventurers.   
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 The Kickapoos did not fully understand the eventual consequences when the 
United States won its independence.  Immediately after the colonists’ victory, settlers 
poured west into the Kentucky and across the Ohio.  The 1803 Louisiana Purchase and 
War of 1812 removed the last remnants of European competition from the backcountry.  
Without their former allies to exploit, and unable to resist the United States army, the 
Kickapoos’ diplomacy could no longer function.  In 1819 the tribe was forced into 
dispossessing treaties and formally stripped of relationships with nations other than the 
U.S. 
Under intense territorial, cultural, and political pressures, the tribe irreparably 
fractured along pre-existing divisions.  Some Kickapoos migrated southwest into Spanish 
and later Mexican Texas, and even as far as Coahuila, Mexico.  Hostile Illinois 
Kickapoos sporadically raided U.S. settlements but eventually bowed to United States 
pressures, relocating to designated territories in present-day Missouri, and later in 
Oklahoma.   Others peacefully resisted removal, but were likewise forced onto lands near 
Fort Leavenworth in present day Kansas in 1832.  Though beyond the scope of this 
paper, these divergent and thereafter successive adaptations of the splintering Kickapoo 
bands is a fascinating subject worthy of additional examination.  Representing 
quintessential types of reactions (flight, fight, and pretended acculturation), the 
Kickapoos serve as a microcosm of broader Native American responses to U.S. imperial 
expansion. 
 While historians have generally overlooked the Kickapoos, anthropologists long 
studied the splintered Algonquian tribe.  In recent decades, the Mexican band of 
Kickapoos received particular attention from anthropologists, who declared them the best 
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preserved representation of pre-European-contact Algonquians.  During the 1960’s two 
sets of ethnologists visited that band: Dolores and Felipe Latorre, and Robert Ritzenthaler 
and Frederick Peterson.  Meanwhile, historian Arrell Gibson penned Lords of the Middle 
Border (1963), an extensive political history that portrays the bands as fierce border 
guards.  Unfortunately he minimizes tribal agency, and overlooks the tribe’s formative 
social and political motivations.  Since then, several anthropology dissertations examined 
the Mexican and Oklahoma bands, again focused on cultural perspectives.  Perhaps the 
single most influential text dealing broadly with the Kickapoos (among other tribes) is 
Richard White’s watershed work, The Middle Ground (1991).  Though White hardly 
mentions the Kickapoos individually, his rendition of the Old Northwest as a place of 
self-interest seeking compromisers defines the most accepted interpretation of the Indians 
surrounding and including the Kickapoos.  While interdisciplinary materials now 
specifically examine the Kickapoos, a revision of their history is long overdue.  Kickapoo 
Foreign Policy seeks to revisit socio-political influences and the Kickapoos political 
strategy during the late colonial era.1  This new interpretation of the Kickapoos history 
                                                 
1 Felipe A. Latorre and Dolores L. Latorre, The Mexican Kickapoo Indians 
(Austin: University of Texas Press, 1976); Robert E. Ritzenthaler and Frederick A. 
Peterson, The Mexican Kickapoo Indians (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1970); A.M. 
Gibson, The Kickapoos: Lords of the Middle Border (Norman: University of Oklahoma 
Press, 1963); Frances Smith Cain, “The Kickapoo Indians, 1832-1895” (PhD. diss., 
University of Oklahoma, 1940); Betty Ann Wilder Dillingham, “Oklahoma Kickapoo” 
(Ph.D. diss., University of Michigan, 1963); Mary Christopher Nunley, “The Mexican 
Kickapoo Indians: Avoidance of Acculturation Through a Migratory Adaptation” (Ph.D 
diss., Southern Methodist University, 1986); Annette I. Kuhlmann, “Collaborative 
Research in Biculturalism Among the Kickapoo Tribe of Oklahoma” “Ph.D. diss., 
University of Kansas, 1982); Ben Wallace, “Oklahoma Kickapoo Culture Change” 
(Master’s thesis, University of Oklahoma, 1963); Richard White, The Middle Ground: 
Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650-1818 (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1991); Special thanks are due to the Ohio Valley Great 
Lakes Archive who’s holdings made possible this endeavor. 
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varies from previous work in several ways.  Perhaps most importantly, it reconciles 
Gibson and White’s somewhat disjointed perspectives.  In White’s geo-cultural region 
termed “the middle ground,” nations and individuals interacted altruistically, each 
seeking out their own best interests through some conflict but generally cooperating.  
White’s participants hoped to “understand the world and reasoning of others.”2  In 
Gibson’s history, the Kickapoos were the hostile border guards who served as 
mercenaries and roamed the borderlands in the service of France and Spain.  Mediating 
these two interpretations, this paper demonstrates that the Kickapoos certainly sought to 
satisfy their own interests but not purely through military adventures nor by well intended 
mutual respect and cooperation.  The Kickapoos employed intrigue, deceit and 
manipulation, hollow promises and open conflict.  Each of these tools served one single 
purpose—the preservation and territorial expansion of the Kickapoos. 
Kickapoo Foreign Policy traces the rise and collapse of the Kickapoos’ colonial 
diplomacy.  It is organized into three chronologically successive chapters, each focusing 
on the Kickapoos’ relations with relevant foreign nations.  From the mid-17th century to 
mid-18th century, the Kickapoos dealt primarily with France and various Indian nations.  
During this period the Kickapoos experimented with diplomatic mechanisms and arrived 
at a policy of shrewd extraction.  The French and Indian War (1754-1763), essentially a 
European conflict hardly involving the Kickapoos, drastically altered the tribe’s political 
environment, and thus signifies the end of the first chapter and beginning of the second.  
Though residual French influence remained after their loss in that war, additional foreign 
nations penetrated the Kickapoos’ territorial dominion, specifically the Spanish and 
                                                 
2 White, 52. 
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British.  As rival nations vied for the tribe’s loyalty, the Kickapoos secured European 
gifts and trade and extended their control over present-day Illinois.  This period was the 
apex of the Kickapoos’ diplomatic exploitation.  The final major shift in the Kickapoos 
political environment occurred more gradually as the United States secured sovereignty 
over the Old Northwest, beginning in the American Revolutionary War, and then 
increasingly so after the United States’ invasion of the region (1790-1791), Jay’s Treaty 
(1794), the Louisiana Purchase (1803), and the War of 1812.  As Europeans withdrew 
and the U.S. seized control of Kickapoo homelands, the tribe’s traditional diplomatic 
measures failed.  This gradual decline represents the third and final chapter.   
The exploration of the Kickapoos’ international diplomatic strategies provides 
four key contributions to the tribe and the academic community.  First, this work presents 
new arguments and interpretations of early tribal history.  This early period is the least 
understood by historians and modern Kickapoos, and is regularly glossed over with only 
superficial comments in tertiary texts addressing Native Americans or even those 
addressing Great Lakes tribes in particular.  There are few historical works that 
specifically examine the Kickapoos themselves.   
The second contribution of this work lies in its usefulness as a unique case study 
of alternative Algonquian responses to European encroachment.  Too often the Old 
Northwest Indians are all generalized in the experiences of the Iroquois and Wyandottes.  
The Old Northwest was home to dozens of tribes who managed the changing world 
through varied diplomatic maneuvers.  As the Kickapoos demonstrate, not all tribes were 
intimately involved in the European alliances and wars that frequently dictate renditions 
of North American history.   
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Third, an examination of the Kickapoos early history sets a necessary foundation 
to better understand fractures that remain major divisions in the tribe today.  When the 
Kickapoos’ system for interacting with foreign powers collapsed, the splintering bands 
adapted divergent strategies that placed each on deviating cultural courses.  Though 
beyond the scope of this paper, the greatest problems facing each Kickapoo band today 
are drastically different.  Kickapoos today are very diverse, geographically and culturally, 
and their variations originate in the under-examined collapse of colonial policy.   
Finally, the fourth significant contribution of this work is to empower the 
Kickapoos as historical playmakers.  For too long North American history has centered 
on Europeans and marginalized the indigenous peoples, relegating them to passive actors 
responding to European and Euro-American figures.  As acclaimed historian Gary Nash 
observed,  
Africans were not merely enslaved.  Indians were not merely driven from 
the land. . . . . To include Africans and Indians in our history in this way, 
simply as victims of the more powerful Europeans, is hardly better than 
excluding them altogether.  It is to render voiceless, nameless, and faceless 
people who powerfully affected the course of our historical development as 
a nation.3  
 
Inspired in part by the preceding passage, this paper hopes to restore the Kickapoos as the 
central actors of their history.  Navigating a rapidly changing political environment, the 
Kickapoos employed stratagem and violence to shape their own future—they were not 
merely respondents to European centered wars and policy.  No less than Europeans, 
Native Americans equally forged their history and independently contributed to the 
history of North America.  
                                                 
3 Nash, Gary B. Red, White, and Black: The Peoples of Early America 
(Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1982), 2-3. 
Developing Political Stratagem: 
Kickapoo Foreign Policy in the Early Colonial Era, 1650-1763 
 
The arrival of European nations introduced new diplomatic complexities to the 
American continent.  While the Spanish forced their way through South America, Central 
America, and the Southwest, the French explored and traded along the northern Atlantic 
seaboard.  British settlements populated the mid and lower Atlantic coast.  The era is 
often viewed as one of European competition carried out through hostile, rival trading 
companies.  Sadly, Native American responses are often minimized, interpreted primarily 
through the historical context of European policy and examined only to the extent that 
they served European purposes of trade and war.  Regardless of such historiographical 
oversights, Indian nations independently forged diplomatic policy to suit their own 
complex motivations, manipulating European powers to achieve their own goals.  The 
Kickapoos, an Algonkian speaking tribe emerging from the Old Northwest, are one such 
example.  Initially, the Kickapoos passively interacted with Europeans (primarily 
French), gradually developing a strategy of neutrality.  Indeed, from the mid 17th century 
to the mid 18th century, Kickapoos relations with the French evolved through four 
progressive stages: indifferent interaction, violent opposition to expansion, shrewd 
compliance, and finally detachment.  Though seemingly innocuous, these diplomatic 
developments set the foundation for a cunning policy of extraction in the late Colonial 
Era.  This early evolution was the origin of Kickapoo diplomatic policy. 
Before European explorers ever penetrated the northern Mississippi River and 
Ohio River valleys, the region was in dispute and long suffered continual conflict.  Small 
bands constituted the fundamental block of society, and each engaged others in sporadic 
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conflict.  This decentralized culture was vulnerable to invading tribes from the north, 
specifically the Sioux and Iroquois.  Mounted on horses traded from the across the 
continent, the Sioux raided southeastward into present-day Michigan and Wisconsin, the 
traditional home of the Sauks, Foxes, Mascoutins and Kickapoos.  From the east, the 
hegemonic Iroquois encroached southwestward, sweeping through and below the Great 
Lakes.  Organized as a single confederate entity around 1570, and soon after armed with 
Dutch firearms, the Iroquois constituted a formidable threat.1  Consequently, the Sauks, 
Foxes, Mascoutins and Kickapoos were wedged between two powerful Indian nations.  
During the late 17th century these small tribes migrated southward, likewise overrunning 
the less centralized Ohio and Illinois River Valley bands residing south of Lake 
Michigan.   When French explorers finally penetrated into present-day Illinois, they 
found a hornet’s nest of warring factions: Kickapoos, Mascoutins, Sauk, Foxes, Illinois, 
Peorias, Cahokias, Weas, Menominees, Pottawattamies, Miami, Kaskaskias, 
Winnebagoes, and more.  The first European explorers to observe the Kickapoos and 
their neighbors, Jacques Marquette and Louis Jolliet, noted that first and foremost, “the 
male role in Illinois society emphasized war and the hunt…”2  Conflict was a major 
characteristic of the region. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 Also known as the Six Nations, the Iroquois nation was constituted of the 
Cayugas, Mohawks, Oneidas, Onondagas, Senecas, and later the Tuscarawas, who joined 
the nation in 1722. 
2 Davis, James E. Frontier Illinois (Bloomington: Indiana Press, 1998), p. 28; 
Raymond E. Hauser, “Warfare and the Illinois Indian Tribe during the Seventeenth 
Century: An Exercise in Ethnohistory,” The Old Northwest 10 (Winter, 1985): p. 368.  
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INDIFFERENT INTERACTION 
 Jesuit Father Claude Allouez was the first European known to have interacted 
with the Kickapoos.3  In 1669 Allouez organized the mission of Saint-François-Xavier on 
the Fox River south of present-day Green Bay.  This mission served as a launch point for 
Jesuits missionaries to penetrate the deep backcountry regions.  That same year Father 
Allouez met several Kickapoo visitors at that mission, and noted that they welcomed 
missionaries to their villages.  Upon visiting in 1670 he found the Kickapoos’ village 
slightly separated from the Mascoutin, Miami and Wea lodges, but otherwise recorded 
little about the tribe.4  Allouez anticipated that there was more than enough missionary 
work to keep him busy just in that region, and resolved to return to the villages yet again, 
which he did in 1672 with the assistance of Father Andrè.5  Unable to attend fully to all 
the western Great Lakes Indians, Allouez prepared materials for yet another Jesuit, 
Jacques Marquette. 
Jacques Marquette and Louis Jolliet began their lives as theologians but the lure 
of the frontier transformed them into explorers and ethnographers.  Born in Quebec, 
                                                 
3 It is possible that the famous French explorer Samuel de Champlain spotted the 
Kickapoos along Lake Michigan during his expeditions into Algonquian regions from 
1608 to 1612, but his failure to identify several of the “Algonkian savages” he met render 
his record incomplete.  The Jesuit Gabriel Druillettes may have seen them in 1658, but 
again the names he recorded are inconsistent with later terminology.  Druillettes speaks 
of the “Outitchakouk,” a thus far unrecognized tribe suspected to be the Kickapoos.  
4 “Mascoutins Indians,” in Kevin Knight, New Advent Catholic Encyclopedia 
(Denver: New Advent, 1995); Reuben Gold Thwaites, Jesuit Relations and Allied 
Documents: Travels and explorations of the French Jesuit Missionaries among the 
Indians of Canada and northern and north-western states of the United States, 1610-
1791: with numerous historical, geographical, ethnological, and bibliographical notes, 
and an analytical index 1672-74, vol. 58 (Cleveland: Burrows Brothers Company), p. 22-
25, 223. 
5 Jesuit Relations, Vol. 54, p. 227-239.  
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Jolliet attended Jesuit seminary but left the order in 1667.  He enjoyed life on the frontier, 
and sought opportunities as a miner and trader among Indians.  Marquette also had an 
itch for the frontier.  Trained as a Jesuit priest in France, he requested a transfer to 
Quebec where he opened Indian missions, first at Chequamegon Bay on the west side of 
Lake Superior (with Allouez), then on the Straits of Mackinac between Lake Michigan 
and Lake Huron, and finally on the south-western shore of Lake Superior at the direction 
of Allouez.  While there a passing party of Illinois Indians presented him with 
information of a great river that ran to a distant ocean—potentially the long sought 
Northwest Passage.  Marquette planned to find that river, and he asked some Wyandot 
Indians to assist in the construction of a reliable canoe.6 
Speculation that the mysterious river was the elusive Northwest Passage quickly 
reached Quebec.  Intendant Jean Talon advised Governor Frontenac to dispatch Louis 
Jolliet to search for the rumored river; Marquette would accompany Jolliet as the 
expedition’s chaplain.  They disembarked from Mackinac in the spring of 1673, 
accompanied by five other Frenchmen in two canoes.  Following the northern shore of 
Lake Michigan they entered Green Bay, and then onto Fox River.  Traveling the Fox they 
met some Illinois Indians who were anxious to make European allies, the tribe suffering 
raids from the aforementioned northern invaders.  The Illinois offered a peace pipe, but at 
the Frenchmen’s insistence the Indians directed the party onward towards the as yet 
unrecognized Mississippi River, inviting the party to return.  Continuing along the Fox, 
the expedition came upon a Miami, Mascoutin and Kickapoo village on June 7, 1673.  
Marquette recorded that the Miami were “more civil” than the Mascoutins and 
                                                 
6 “Jacques Marquette,” New Advent Catholic Encyclopedia. 
 13
Kickapoos, whom he described as “ruder and more like peasants.”7  The party departed 
the village on June 10th with two Miami guides and no additional notations.   
The meaning of Marquette’s simple passage regarding the Kickapoos is open to 
speculation.  It may thinly veil a confrontation, or simply an uncomfortable feeling.  
Apparently these Europeans found the Kickapoos less cordial than the Miamis and 
Illinois.  The root of the Kickapoos disposition is equally enigmatic.  However, the tribe 
did allow the foreigners peaceful passage.  Perhaps the Kickapoos were still undecided 
about the newcomers.  Not only had Kickapoos visited Saint-François-Xavier after its 
completion in 1669, but they were likely aware of other explorers and proliferating Jesuit 
missions along the southern shores of the Great Lakes.  As early as 1660, Jesuits 
established a mission on the shore of Keweenaw Bay, just north of present-day L’Anse, 
Michigan.  In 1665 Allouez organized a mission among the Chippewa named Saint 
Esprit, located on the south shore of Lake Superior.  Next, the French mission of Sault 
Saint Marie appeared at the junction of the three westernmost Great Lakes, and then 
Mackinaw at present-day St. Ignace, Michigan.  In 1688 Allouez founded St. Joseph to 
minister among the Pottawatomies living near present-day Niles, Michigan.  Historians 
must conclude that the Kickapoos were conscious of the newcomers and, for whatever 
reason, chose to remain indifferent to the French, neither welcoming nor repulsing their 
first visitors.8   
                                                 
7 “The Voyages and Discoveries of Father James Marquette in the Valley of the 
Mississippi,” John Gilmary Shea, Discovery and Exploration of the Mississippi Valley, 
with the Original Narratives of Marquette, Allouez, Membre, Hennepin, and Anastase 
(Douay, Albany: J. McDonough, 1903), p. 15-16. 
8 “Catholic Indian Missions of the United States,” “Claude Allouez,” New Advent 
Catholic Encyclopedia.  
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After a short portage, Marquette and Jolliet reached the Wisconsin which local 
Indians claimed fed into a mighty river.  They reached the Mississippi on June 17, 1673, 
but were soon turned back by rumors of hostile Indians and the fear of Spanish agents.  
On a return voyage, the expedition circumvented the Mississippi’s powerful down 
currents by traveling up the Illinois to Green Bay.  The following year Marquette 
attempted to return to the Illinois, but he was delayed and did not arrive until the spring 
of 1675.  He established the Mission of the Immaculate Conception on the Illinois River 
and preached to the Indians, though he rapidly fell sick and died of dysentery while 
returning home.9  Despite limited contact with the Kickapoos, the expedition’s charts of 
the Fox, Illinois, and Mississippi rivers provided France with a map of major river ways 
through the tribe’s new homelands. 
 A third definitive interaction between Kickapoos and the French surfaces in the 
expeditions of René Robert Cavalier, Sieur de La Salle.  Like Jolliet, this churchman 
abandoned his religious career for a life of exploration.  His indigenous contacts are 
convoluted in the erroneous documentation of his travels, but in January of 1680 he did 
descend the Illinois River and spent the night with a band of Peoria Indians.  Fearing 
marauding Iroquois, Peorias asked La Salle to help defend them.  La Salle ordered his 
men to construct Fort Crevecoeur for the Indians’ defense.  In April, La Salle left a 
contingency of men at Crevecoeur and traveled to another post.  In his absence, the 
remaining seven Europeans stripped the fort of supplies, burned it the ground, and 
abandoned the fort.  The men also abandoned their chaplain, Jesuit Father Gabriel de la 
Ribourde.   
                                                 
9 “Catholic Indian Missions in the United States,” New Advent Catholic 
Encyclopedia; Jesuit Relations, vol. 54, p. 86, 164. 
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Not long after, Kickapoo warriors fell upon Friar Gabriel.  La Salle later reported 
that a band of Kickapoos, en route to raid against the Iroquois, murdered the Jesuit.  The 
young warriors “pierced him with arrows, without our being aware of it.”10   Another 
Jesuit later recorded,  
The Kickapoos, a little nation you may observe on the west, quite near the 
Winnebagos, had sent some of their youth in war parties against the 
Iroquois, but learning that the latter were attacking the Illinois, the war-
party came after them.  Three braves who formed a kind of advanced 
guard having met the good father alone, although they knew that he was 
not an Iroquois, killed him for all that, cast his body into a hole, and 
carried off even his breviary, and diurnal, which soon after came to the 
hands of a Jesuit father.  They carried off the scalp of this holy man, and 
vaunted of it in their village as an Iroquois scalp.11   
 
The assumption that the Kickapoos knew the Jesuit was not an Iroquois does not imply 
the attack was directed at the French.  On the contrary, the Kickapoos were indifferent 
toward foreigners.  When it was convenient, the French were tolerated; but when a 
Frenchman wondered into the path of an advancing war party, neither nationality nor 
ecclesiastic status guaranteed any protection.  The event was probably insignificant to the 
Kickapoos, who simply saw one more casualty in the region’s violent culture of conflict. 
Initially the Kickapoos were too preoccupied with neighboring tribes to give 
considerable thought to the French newcomers. The Iroquois continued to raid the 
Kickapoos, pushing the tribe further south into present-day Illinois.  Advancing in all 
                                                 
10 “Letter from Cavelier de La Salle,” Account of the Journey of Cavelier de La 
Salle, from he 22nd of August 1680 to the autumn of 1681, Bibliotheque Nationale. Fonds 
Clairambault 1016. fol. 157, Kickapoo file, Ohio Valley Great Lakes Ethnohistory 
Archive, Bloomington Indiana (hereafter noted as OVGLE Archive; all OVGLE 
resources cited herein are located in the Kickapoo file unless otherwise noted). 
11 “Narrative of the Adventures of La Salle’s Party at Fort Crevecoeur, in Illinois, 
from February, 1680, to June, 1681, by Father Zenobius Membre, Recollect,” John 
Gilmary Shea, Discovery and Exploration of the Mississippi Valley, with the Original 
Narratives of Marquette, Allouez, Membre, Hennepin, and Anastase (Douay, Albany: J. 
McDonough, 1903), p. 153-154. 
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directions, the well-armed and unified Iroquois may have seemed an unstoppable force.  
One French explorer observed,  
Although there are only about 2,500 warriors amongst them, as they are 
the best armed and most accustomed to war in all North America they 
have carried their arms in all directions, 800 leagues round, that is, toward 
the Gulf of St. Lawrence, to the northern sea, into Florida, and even 
beyond the Mississippi.  They have destroyed more than thirty tribes, and 
in the last eighty years have put to death more than 600,000 souls, and 
have left the greater part of the countries round the great lakes 
uninhabited.12 
 
Though these estimates may be unreliable, the passage captures the popular perception 
and awe of the Iroquois’ enemies.  The Kickapoos were under pressure from a powerful 
expanding force, and they regularly sent war parties of their own to challenge the 
Iroquois. 
Among other advantages, European technology made the Iroquois formidable as 
traders and warriors.  The Six Nations enjoyed close proximity to Dutch and French trade 
posts, which they visited regularly.  The Kickapoos’ access was limited, generally cut off 
by the confrontational Iroquois who profited by maintaining a buffer between Europeans 
in the east and the otherwise inaccessible western tribes.  This technological disparity is 
well illustrated by a Jesuit priest who optimistically assessed missionary opportunities 
stemming from some recently converted Iroquois.  He noted,  
For our Iroquois have discovered, beyond the Cat Nation, other and 
numerous Nations who speak the Algonquin language. There are more 
than thirty villages whose inhabitants have never had any knowledge of 
Europeans; they still use only stone hatchets and knives, and the other 
things that these Savages used before they began to trade with the 
French.13 
 
                                                 
12 De la Sall or Faher member, Magry, Account of the Discoveries and Journies of 
Sieur de la Salle,1679-80-81, vol. 1, p. 543-544, OVGLE Archive. 
13 Jesuit Relations, vol. 44, p. 49. 
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Indeed, the Iroquois presented an impressive empire isolating the Illinois and 
Ohio region tribes from French, Dutch, and British goods. 
 
FRENCH EXPANSION 
As French missions and posts trickled down through the three western Great 
Lakes circumventing the Iroquois, the Kickapoos too found irregular access to European 
technology.  Marquette and Jolliet noted villages on the southern shores of Lake 
Michigan, and in 1696 Father Francois Pinet established the Mission of Guardian Angel 
at present-day Chicago.  The mission was abandoned in 1700, but remained a popular 
region for daring traders and a source of French influence in present-day Illinois.  As 
early as 1685, the French built Prairie du Chien on the Wisconsin.  Seven years later 
France penetrated deeper, erecting Fort Pimitoui on the Illinois River in 1692.  And in 
1703, Jesuits repeatedly caught between warring tribes relocated the Kaskaskia Indian’s 
mission south of Pimitoui near present-day St. Louis.  Another permanent source of 
European influence emanated from the French trading post of Detroit.  In 1698, 
entrepreneur Antoine de la Mothe Cadillac convinced the court of Louis XIV that a 
French post in the west was necessary to check growing British colonies in the east.  
Descending from Lake Huron to the St. Clair River and its namesake lake, the French 
erected the post only partially down the contiguous Detroit River.  Established in 1701, 
Detroit ensured regular French influence in the region.   
In addition to Kickapoo conflicts with the Iroquois, the Sioux also engaged the 
Kickapoos quite regularly.  Usually joining with the Foxes and Mascoutins, the 
Kickapoos defended and counter raided against the powerful Sioux nations and its allies, 
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including the Iowas and Osages.14  The arrival of the French complicated the crisis, as 
traders sought to attract competing tribes to central trading posts.   
One such post was erected across from the Des Moines River, southeast of the 
Kickapoos then residing along the Illinois River.  French traders demanded Sioux, 
Omahas, Kickapoos, Foxes and Mascoutins all trade at that post.  Hesitant to make a long 
trek southward, the French enticed the Sioux by limiting trade at northern posts.  
Likewise, the Kickapoos, Foxes and Mascoutins were prohibited from trading at Detroit, 
and France temporarily forbade all traders there from servicing those tribes.  Intending to 
create a major trade hub near the Des Moines, the French fully expected to draw the 
Kickapoos into locations convenient to French trade, assigning them locations to live and 
hunt as European lords might manage peasants.  Noting the withdrawing Illinois Indians 
and expecting the Kickapoos to migrate into those lands, one French official explained,  
When the Illinois have left their country, we shall easily get the 
Mascoutins and the Kickapoos to occupy it.  That would give us 450 good 
men, who are now on the streams falling into the Illinois River and the 
Mississippi.  Their only occupation is hunting for beaver skins, which they 
go and sell at the Green Bay and in the Illinois country…. By taking these 
Miamis, Mascoutins and Kickapoos, formerly on the Mississippi, from 
their present stations and placing them on the Illinois River or lower 
down, the beaver-trade of Canada will be relieved of fifteen thousand 
skins a year.15 
 
The French truly believed they could manipulate and move the various tribes to hunt and 
trap in assigned regions.  The complex concerns and issues facing the tribes were not 
even considered—it was as though the Indians existed only to profit the crown. 
                                                 
14 Blair, Nicoles Perrot vol. 1, p. 171, OVGLE Archive; “Le Sueur’s Voyage up 
the Mississippi,” Shea, Early Voyages up and Down the Mississippi, p. 92-93. 
15 “Memorandum by d’Iberville, June 20, 1702,” Magry, vol. 4, p. 661-662, 
OVGLE Archive. 
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Aspirations of incorporating the Kickapoos into a European trade empire met two 
major obstacles: reliably circumventing the Iroquois barrier and pacifying the tumultuous 
Illinois and Ohio Country.  At the turn of the century the Iroquois began an era termed by 
one historian as “the Iroquois restoration.”16  During this time the nation made peace with 
neighboring Europeans and Indians, ideally facilitating France’s desire to access the 
region southwest of the Great Lakes.  That left only one obstacle to French expansion and 
trade profits.  In 1701 a large coalition of Sauks, Winnebagos, Menominees, Foxes, 
Potawatomis and Kickapoos assembled at Green Bay, preparing to launch a major assault 
on the Dakota Sioux.  However, a French emissary at the settlement dissuaded the 
Indians from their nefarious designs.17  But such acquiescence was no pledge of peace, 
simply a temporary adjournment of war—and the French knew it.  To ensure lasting 
peace, the crown was willing to apply pressure wherever it could.  In one report a French 
official explained,  
Send definite orders to the commandant at Detroit on no account to permit 
any Frenchman to go to trade with the Fox or Mascoutins or Kickapoos, 
nor to Green Bay, nor even to Chicago; and forbid them to make war 
against any of the Indians on the Missouri.  If no one goes to those tribes, 
they will be obliged to come straight to Detroit or to the posts on the 
Mississippi; if they do not, we need not trouble, for these Indians cannot 
go to any other Europeans. By this means we shall have control of them.18 
 
This obscene French audacity was unmatched by anything the Kickapoos previously 
experienced.  Surely the Kickapoos were appalled at France’s attempts to manipulate and 
seize “control of them.”  Dictating where the tribe could hunt, trade, and reside was 
                                                 
16 Richard Aquila, The Iroquois Restoration: Iroquois Diplomacy on the Colonial 
Frontier, 1701-1754 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1983), title. 
17 “Keeting: Long’s Second Expedition: 1824: vol. 1, p. 425-426, OVGLE 
Archive. 
18 “Memorandum on the Settlement of Mobile and the Mississippi,” English 
Translation of Margry, vol. 4, p. 650-657, OVGLE Archive. 
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audacious enough; mandating these demands through aggressive economic and 
diplomatic restrictions was certain go over poorly in the Kickapoos tribal councils. 
 At one time the Kickapoos and French co-existed too distant to interact much, but 
with each year French influences expanded, making it all that much harder to ignore 
Europeans.  The French erected settlements at Cahokia (1699), Detroit (1701) and 
Kaskaskia (1703), and more traders surfaced every spring.  Then in 1717 France annexed 
the Illinois Valley and Scottish financier John Law purchased the Mississippi Company 
with intents to promote Mississippi River settlement along with his pocketbook.  By the 
1720’s, backcountry silver and lead mining also to attract Europeans.  France became 
territorially, economically, and politically intrusive. 
More than simply infringing on indigenous lands, the Europeans sought to 
undermine Native cultures.  French traders hoped to transform Indians into fur harvesting 
employees.  Though traders capitalized on customary Indian skills such as hunting and 
trapping, the introduction of European goods and ideas displaced traditional 
responsibilities to tribe, band and family units.  Even more disruptive, Jesuit Priests 
continued to pour forth into Indian lands, each one seeking to supplant the autochthonous 
culture with Christian principles.  Speaking of Indians in general, one Jesuit observed that 
many are “averse to embracing Christianity,” but acquiesced to pressures demanding they 
send their children to the local mission chapels.  Additionally, 
You will be surprised to learn that several of these jugglers, when they fall 
ill, willingly have recourse to the missionary; and there are but few who do 
not listen to him, and who do not admit that there is a Great Spirit, the 
maker of all things, who alone must be adored. Recently one of the chief 
men asked to be instructed, after having 10% resisted. Afterward, when he 
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fell ill, and was near his end, he had no rest until he at last received holy 
baptism, while exhorting all his children to embrace our religion.19 
 
Though Indian conversion may not genuinely reflect an exclusive acceptance of 
Christianity, the Jesuits were making an impact.  They hoped to “save” Indians 
from their “pagan” ways.  One by one if necessary, the Jesuits existed solely to 
transform Indian ideas and culture. 
 French political intentions also influenced backcountry tribes.  By 1708 the Sauks 
and Pottawattamies were particularly concerned, as they heard that the French bribed the 
Kickapoos, Weas and Miamis to suspend Sioux raids and refocus attacks on their own 
neighbors.  Speaking to a Wea chief, a joint delegation of one Sauk and one 
Pottawattamie asked about the recent politicking.  They noted the French “made presents 
to the Miamis, the Wea and Kickapoos, to induce them to tomahawk us all, instead of 
exhorting them to go with us against the Sioux.”20  Whether or not the French had made 
such gestures is questionable, but it seems likely given the Kickapoo diplomacy that 
evolved.  No evidence remains to corroborate the Indians concerns, but such behavior 
would later become a central tenet of Kickapoo foreign policy. 
 
VIOLENT OPPOSTION TO FRENCH EXPANSION 
 With their land, political sovereignty, and cultural independence all under siege, 
the Kickapoos were in no condition to challenge the French and their Indian allies.  
Generations of war had taken its toll on the Kickapoos, and by the eighteenth century the 
                                                 
19 “Letter of Father Julien Binneteau, of the Society of Jesus, to a Father of the 
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tribe clearly demonstrated signs of prolonged warfare.  One explorer described the 
Kickapoos as “almost all crippled with wounds and covered with scars, being always at 
war.”  Even combined with their Mascoutin allies, by 1710 the two tribes could only 
marshal one hundred and fifty warriors.21  Regardless of such obvious weaknesses, the 
tribe grew tired of French meddling and imperialism, and in 1712 the Kickapoos’ policy 
of indifference to France came to a screeching halt.   
 In the winter of 1711/12, Kickapoos and other neighboring nations continued to 
engage in typical small skirmishes.  In one incident, a Kickapoo chief “seized” some 
Wyandots, a tribe historically allied to the French.  During the following spring the 
Wyandots returned the favor, raiding some Kickapoos.  A boat full of Kickapoos traveled 
to Detroit where they hoped to rally other tribes to their cause.  While en route, the 
Wyandots fell upon the Kickapoo boat where they found the same chief whom they 
sought to punish.  He was decapitated and his head delivered to the French.  Demanding 
vengeance, band of Kickapoos then intercepted the first Frenchmen they saw, a man 
surnamed Langlois who was carrying official documents back to Canadian Governor 
Philippe de Rigaud, Marquis de Vaudreuil.  The letters were destroyed, and Langlois was 
sent back to Canada with an unspoken message—the French were no longer welcome.22  
The Kickapoos rallied their long time allies, the Mascoutins and Foxes, and raided 
Europeans whenever the opportunity arose.  Vaudreuil soon observed, “This tribe of the 
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Foxes, Kickapoos, and Mascoutins is found everywhere when they are least expected, 
and they are people who will listen to no reason, and have no pity.”23   
 Realizing that alone they were no match for France and its allied tribes, the 
Kickapoos experimented with a new political option—peace with the Iroquois.  Aware 
that the French and allied Wyandots and Ottawas experienced a long tradition of war with 
the Iroquois, the Kickapoos invited the Iroquois to council in 1714.24  Supported by the 
Iroquois, the Kickapoos hoped to seal off the French once more.  Unfortunately for the 
Kickapoos, the weakened Iroquois had likewise turned to a new policy of peaceful 
diplomacy, but with the French.  A few years earlier the Iroquois negotiated an 
unprecedented treaty with the French, inadvertently undermining emerging Kickapoo 
intentions.  Having hunted out their own lands, the Iroquois were desperate to gain access 
to western territories.  France offered to support that desire if the Iroquois would join the 
French trade empire.  That policy began in 1701 with the Grand Settlement Treaty at 
Montreal, which guaranteed Iroquois neutrality in all French conflicts.  The Iroquois then 
made peace with western tribes allied to France so that they could peacefully hunt in their 
homelands.  The Iroquois also maintained friendly relations with Britain, who facilitated 
a 1710 treaty between the Iroquois and the Ottawas.25  The Iroquois hoped to rejuvenate 
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their nation through mutual friendship with all Indians and Europeans.  If the Kickapoos 
intended to oppose the French, they would have only their Mascoutin and Fox allies.26   
Petty Kickapoo raids proved effective, stirring the wrath of the French.  From 
1712 to 1715, Kickapoos and their allies continued to threaten French traders, and the 
tribe restricted the aggressive French diplomatic overtures.  Meanwhile, French intrigues 
to limit the Kickapoos’ trade failed to constrain the tribe.  Equally futile were French 
attempts to manipulate the tribe’s foreign relations, as French-allied tribes fruitlessly 
admonished peace.  Still France hoped to absorb the tribe into their trade empire; if the 
Kickapoos allegiance could not be won in diplomacy, it would be earned through military 
subjugation.   
 On November 20, 1715, France orchestrated a massive three-pronged attack 
against the Kickapoos and Mascoutins.  Receiving intelligence that the Kickapoos’ 
warriors were hunting away from their villages, France mobilized “a detachment of 
savages from St. Louis sent by Monsieur de Ramezay, the Wyandots of Detroit, and a 
detachment of Potowatomies” to raid the defenseless elders, women and children at the 
village.  The French allies fell upon a large Kickapoo-Mascoutin village and destroyed 
their cattail-weaved cabins, leaving little more than ashes.  They then tracked down the 
warriors that were away hunting, and after trapping them against a steep rock, killed over 
a hundred men and took forty-seven prisoners.  Coming to the aid of their friends, the 
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Foxes massed several hundred warriors to intercept the French allied tribes.  After a long 
battle lasting from dawn until mid-afternoon, the Foxes too were defeated.27   
 Unable to secure a treaty with the defiant Kickapoos, on October 12, 1716, Sieur 
de Louvigny came to Quebec with a treaty he had forced upon the Foxes.  It stipulated 
first that the Foxes would make peace with France and all French-allied tribes.  Second, 
“that they shall by forcible or friendly means bring the Kickapoos and Mascoutins, their 
allies and our enemies, to make peace as they do, with all the nations in general.”  Third, 
the Foxes were to release any French-allied Indian prisoners; fourth, the tribe was to 
attack non-French-allied tribes, capturing slaves “to replace all the dead who had been 
slain during the course of the war.”  Fifth, the Fox were to hunt for the French, 
surrendering their spoils to pay the costs of the war.  Finally, the tribe was to deliver up 
children from six chiefs as collateral against any treachery.28   
 This French statement of authority was received not only by the Foxes, but by the 
Kickapoos as well.  The battle was likely the single greatest loss in the tribe’s living 
memory—nearly wiping out an entire band.  Surviving Kickapoos surely spent that 
winter in discussion, deciding how to respond to the French display of strength.  
Weighing their options, the Kickapoos chose a revolutionary policy, perhaps inspired by 
their recent Iroquois dealings.  The tribe would ask for peace.  Luring the French into a 
false sense of security, the Kickapoos decided to feign submission for the time.  During 
the following summer, a Kickapoo chief sent a message to the French.  A French official 
explained,  
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The chief of the Kickapoos came to declare to the first Frenchmen whom 
he encountered that both his nation and that of the Mascoutins threw 
themselves into the arms of Monsieur de Vaudreuil, their Father, declaring 
themselves his slaves, to be dispersed among whatever action he judged 
proper; and that moreover, if the Fox refused to share in these sentiments, 
they would deliver them up to the kettle.29   
 
The new policy was clear only to the Kickapoos.  On the surface they pledged allegiance 
to France, but it was only a temporary solution.  By employing a fluid loyalty the tribe 
could survive and hopefully strengthen until the Kickapoos could reassert themselves as 
one of the dominant western tribes.  Offering to turn against long time allies was a 
dangerously treacherous step, but the Kickapoos knew the Foxes had made peace with 
France, and that the latter had little need to attack the former.  Nevertheless, the offer 
represented a startlingly new undercurrent in Kickapoo-Fox relations that would surface 
in the near future.  In the meantime, the maneuver succeeded in endearing the Kickapoos 
to the French, enabling the tribe to endure in a new political environment of quickly 
changing loyalties.   
 
SHREWD COMPLIANCE  
 Empowered by guarantees of support, or at least neutrality, from France and the 
many French-allied tribes, in 1718 the Kickapoos reinstituted an aggressive policy of 
territorial domination that continued for over forty years.  Virtually united with the 
Mascoutin tribe after generations of cohabitation, the Kickapoo-Mascoutin nation turned 
its fury on the Illinois Indians much as before the arrival of the French. 
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Beginning in 1718 French reports arrived at Governor Vaudreuil’s desk 
elucidating the sudden Kickapoo resurgence.  The reports also explained the Foxes, 
traditional allies of the Kickapoos and Mascoutins, chose not to participate.30  Instead, 
they strictly adhered to a peaceful policy of neutrality in accordance with the French 
treaty of 1715.  But that policy did not last long.  By 1721, the Foxes joined the 
Kickapoos and Mascoutins, decimating the Illinois Indians.  The Foxes were not the only 
tribe to join forces with the reinvigorated Kickapoos.  According to one French report, 
the Kickapoo’s alliance included Mascoutins, Foxes, Sauks, Winnebagoes, and even 
Sioux.  The cooperation of the Sioux was a particularly valuable development for the 
Kickapoos, as this new allegiance of a long-time enemy further strengthened the 
Kickapoo drive for territorial supremacy in the Illinois Country.31  
As Kickapoos reasserted their might, their French “allies” also continued to 
expand.  In 1720 the French erected Fort Chartres along the Mississippi River, eighteen 
miles north of Kaskaskia.  European workers gathering at Kaskaskia swelled the French 
village’s size.  Once Chartres was completed, it became the administrative hub of the 
region.  Two years later, in 1722, the French erected Fort Prairie du Rocher four miles 
east of Chartres, further spreading French influence and authority. 
 Again unhappy with increasing French intrusions, and emotionally inflated by 
victories over the Illinois, the Kickapoos, Mascoutins and Foxes took an aggressive 
stance against the French once more.  In 1723 the Foxes raided French settlements.  The 
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French were surprised at the resumption of hostilities, especially after the Indians’ 
decimating defeat only eight years earlier.  One official questioned whether the chiefs had 
control over their young warriors.  But the Foxes were not the only marauders.  The 
Kickapoos too began raiding French traders, killing five men along the Wabash River in 
1725.32  In the spring of that year, two other Frenchmen were also killed by a mixed party 
of Kickapoos and young Fox warriors.33  Additionally, Kickapoos and Foxes attempted to 
block French access to their new friends, the Sioux.  That maneuver failed though, most 
obviously in 1727 when the Jesuits established two missions among the Sioux.34 
 The French response to Kickapoo and Fox aggressions was more peaceful than 
before.  The French began by negotiating with Ouachala, a Fox chief.  Ouachala told the 
French that his young men were out of control, and that he had no desire to disrupt the 
peace.  His solution was French benevolence to win over the youth.  The French were not 
initially convinced of this strategy, and they debated the merits of generosity versus the 
alternative—a major military campaign into the distant Illinois Valley.  After some 
debate, French officials opted to wait out the Fox, treating them peaceably in hopes that 
the elders could again restrain their youth.  This solution, the French hoped, would again 
create a mediator between the crown and the Kickapoos.  Of this plan, one official wrote,  
Then, after the treaty of peace made with the Foxes and their allies has 
been renewed, we could, the following summer, have Ouachala, Principal 
chief of the Foxes, come down to Montreal with the war chiefs of the 
Sauks, Winnebagoes, Kickapoos, Mascoutins, and Sioux—one of each of 
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these nations allied with the Foxes, in order to interrogate them regarding 
the situation of affairs where they are, and at the same time to declare to 
them the intentions of the King.35 
 
The French plan to placate the Fox and then employ them to pacify other tribes was 
underway, and Governor Vandruil expected it to take several years.  In the meantime, 
increasingly belligerent Kickapoos raided, kidnapped and killed any Europeans in their 
homelands.    
 In November of 1728 Kickapoos fell upon an elite party returning from St. 
Michael, one of the two missions recently established among the Sioux.  Among other 
officers and seigniors, the party included St. Michael’s founder, Jesuit Father Guignas.  
The events that followed radically redefined Kickapoo foreign policy. 
 On the 16th of November, at eight o’clock in the morning, the French expedition 
came across a band of Kickapoos and Mascoutins who were out hunting.  Fearing the 
Indians, the twelve well-armed Frenchmen prepared their powder and lead.  To their 
surprise, the Kickapoos called out, “What fear ye, my brothers?  The Foxes are far from 
here.  We are Kickapoos and Mascoutins and have no evil designs.”  The professed 
friendship was suspicious, but still preferable to open conflict. 
 Kickapoos and Mascoutins descended from the banks, surrounded the boats, and 
proceeded to force themselves between the Frenchmen, insisting the visitors join them at 
their village.  Overwhelmed and afraid, the French acquiesced.  Together they walked to 
a nearby village, where the twelve men were escorted to a lodge set aside for their private 
use.  There they were peacefully imprisoned as “guests” for the next five months.  
Despite failed attempts at flight, bribery and reason, the French found no escape.  
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 During the five-month captivity, the Kickapoos’ antagonistic attitude towards the 
Frenchmen gradually changed, until finally a completely new posture blossomed.  As 
early as the second day of their captivity, the French were subjected to verbal 
harassments and accusations.  Ironically, Kickapoo chiefs accused the French of violence 
and duplicity, and voiced anger for France’s intentions to force Kickapoos to migrate to 
French-chosen locations.  When Father Guignos attempted to defend himself, explaining 
that the Jesuits had no part in military and political maneuvers, he was censured.  “Be 
silent, you old babbler,” one warrior insisted.  The Frenchmen were not brought to the 
village for discussion, but rather for the tribe’s protection.  French allied Indians had 
recently threatened the Kickapoos.  Some even pledged to attack during the winter—a 
universally perceived peacetime during any conflict.  To ensure the tribe’s safety, the 
Frenchmen were taken hostage.  That motivation came clear one week into their captivity 
when a Kickapoo explained to Father Guignos that the imprisonment was “for the 
purpose of saving our children’s lives that we stop you; you will be our safeguard.”  And 
so despite a hostile disposition, the Kickapoos intended to preserve their captives’ lives—
their fates were inseparably bound for the winter season.  One Frenchman later recounted 
that the Kickapoos “fear French retaliation should a Frenchman die while in their 
custody.”  The hostages had to be kept alive.36 
 The Foxes, old allies of the Kickapoos who recently resumed raids against the 
French, had a different plan for the hostages.  When they heard of the Kickapoos’ 
captives, several Foxes visited the village.  They voiced anger at France’s intrusion into 
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the Foxes’ homelands, and they demanded the Kickapoos yield up a hostage to be 
punished.  The Kickapoos refused and expelled the contentious visitors.  On their way 
home, those angered Foxes came across a party of Kickapoos and Mascoutins, whom 
they attacked.  Two Indians died: one Kickapoo and one Mascoutin.  Fearful of an 
immerging rift between the tribes, a Fox chief later donated the lives of five Fox men as 
payment for the two dead.  Frustrated by the situation, a Kickapoo chief griped to his 
captives, “You are the cause of our being massacred…. And we are paying very dearly 
for the pleasure of having you.”37 
 Obviously upset by the conflict, the Kickapoos turned to their French captives, 
inviting them to negotiate with the Foxes and neighboring tribes.  Playing the victim, the 
Kickapoos explained that they had suffered death because they protected the French, and 
now the French owed them this service.  A keen Frenchman responded,  
If the Foxes have killed you as you assert, you see that they no longer look 
upon you as their kin.  I exhort you to avenge yourselves.  You may rest 
assured that the wicked nation can live no longer.  The King wishes their 
death.38 
 
With those words the French not only encouraged the Kickapoos to turn on their long-
time allies, but also extended a provocative opportunity.  The French reassured the 
Kickapoos that they could once again be the masters of their region if they only accepted 
the French as their liege. 
 During the following spring, French allied tribes rallied against the belligerent 
Foxes yet again.  Kickapoos were well aware of the political climate.  They could choose 
any of three actions: defend the Fox against the odds; assume neutrality without gain or 
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loss; or they could turn on their long-time friends and ally with French, winning the 
spoils of war, trade, and French neutrality in their own attempts to dominate the region.  
The Kickapoos chose the later, and by autumn of 1729 the Foxes were begging the 
French to call off the attacks.39   
 Determined to punish the treacherous Foxes, France organized a series of allied 
raids against the tribe.  These plains culminated in a major campaign during August of 
1730.  A large contingent of Kickapoos and Mascoutins complimented an army of 100 
Frenchmen and 400 Indians.  Together they attacked the Foxes early in the month.  
Another mass of French allied tribes attacked the Foxes again later in August.  The 
Commandant of Fort Detroit observed, “When the Winnebagoes, Mascoutins, and 
Kickapoos learned this, they marched thither.”  Soon after, a band of Foxes was 
discovered engaging some Illinois Indians, and so the Kickapoos fell upon the Foxes’ 
rear.  “Consequently the Foxes found themselves by this attack hemmed in by the Illinois 
on the side and on the other by the Winnebagoes, Kickapoos, and Mascoutins.”40  Again 
in August the French-allies attacked another Fox band, trapping them in a fort for three 
weeks.  One officer recorded that the Foxes tried to escape under cover of night.  The 
French allies chased them down the following morning when France’s Indian 
confederacy “routed them” and killed over 200 Foxes.41  As in their former domination of 
the Illinois and Peorias, Kickapoos again demonstrated their militant might, fiercely 
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pursuing the Foxes.  One French officer observed, “Our Kickapoos and Mascoutins did 
wonders on this expedition, and all did equally well, vying with one another.” 42 
The new Kickapoo alliance with France was not without its weaknesses.  On 
occasion, the Kickapoos demonstrated stubborn independence.  At other times, the 
French suspected the tribe of secret alliances with the Fox.  One Frenchman questioned 
the loyalty of the Kickapoos.  They, he explained,  
only formed an apparent league with us against the Fox Indians—rather 
with the object of protecting them than to destroy them.  All these tribes 
together, united by their relationship to one another are simply held back 
by fear; and if they abase themselves now, it is in order to draw down 
supplies which they share with the Fox Indians…. Let us rather say that, 
although they went [to war against the Fox] it was only in order to save 
them.43 
 
Despite such concerns, the immerging Franco-Kickapoo relationship generally 
blossomed over the succeeding fifteen years.  In exchange for tolerating French 
expansion, the Kickapoos received trade goods and re-emerged as a regional power.  But 
with each year the French entrenched themselves deeper in the Illinois and Ohio Country. 
 French intrusion southwest of the Great Lakes increased significantly from 1732 
onward.  In that year Post Vincennes was established on the east end of the Wabash.  Its 
French population continued to grow, so much that in 1749 the village erected an 
imposing Catholic cathedral to meet the needs of French populations and converted 
Indians.  From that village, French traders flooded the region with European goods and 
influence.  From 1740 to 1748, France constructed a string of forts in the Ohio Country 
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designed to obstruct British expansion and monopolize the region’s fur trapping.  French 
gifts, trade, and services again enticed tribes to relocate near the posts. 
Increasingly valuing European goods, the Kickapoos grew to accept French 
expansion.  So enamored with the products, by 1742 the Kickapoos requested a French 
blacksmith and regular traders, which were offered in exchange for Kickapoo service as 
mercenaries against Chickasaws, a southern tribe that stubbornly refused French 
hegemony.44  When the French constructed a new fort on the Wabash the Kickapoos 
were quickly convinced to move nearby in order to gain access to French services.  Two 
months later French negotiations led to the migration of another Kickapoo band, likewise 
seeking European goods.  One official recorded,  
The Shawnee, Kickapoos & Mascoutins, will on this measures’ 
Succeeding, settle so as to Cover the Mississippi. – but they indispensably 
expect to be furnished with Indian Goods. – if we cannot do this; - they 
will fall off to the English, more than ever alienated from the French.45 
 
Though French expansion was the source of previous conflicts between the French and 
Kickapoos, after a hundred years of exposure to European products the tribe developed 
an affinity for foreign goods.  Just as French traders and Jesuits had hoped, Indian culture 
grew more dependent on European products, so much so that expansion could be 
tolerated for the guarantee of trade goods and French neutrality in Kickapoo territorial 
conquests. 
By November 1742, Kickapoos and Mascoutins had spread across present-day 
Illinois from the Wabash to the Mississippi, asserting territorial dominance over other 
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tribes and securing French trade.  During the succeeding five years, Kickapoo bands 
settled as far east as Detroit, dispelling any tribes that resisted French authority in present 
day Indiana.46  As Kickapoos gained access to French gifts, trade and services, their 
formerly hostile relations transformed into a pleasant co-existence.  In 1748 one French 
report listed the Kickapoos among “Nations that had long been attached to the French.”47  
Working together the Kickapoos resurfaced as one of the dominant tribes while the 
French secured their supremacy over other would-be European intruders and non-
compliant tribes. 
 In the years building up to and through the French and Indian War, France 
continued to erect backcountry forts.  In 1749 France rebuilt a post among the Miami on 
the Ohio River.  By 1750 Sainte Genevieve was a growing French town located sixty-five 
miles south of St. Louis along the Mississippi River.  Within a few years a small chain of 
French forts descended south from Lake Erie through present-day Pennsylvania.  In 1754 
the French upgraded an old trading post at the junction of the Allegheny and 
Monongahela Rivers, creating Fort Duquesne at what is today downtown Pittsburgh.   
 
DETACHMENT 
Regardless of what appeared to be a booming Indian trade industry, France lacked 
the funds and naval strength to continue shipping gifts to North America’s Indians.  
Backcountry Indians accustomed to French gifts and trade surely noticed France’s 
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declining generosity.  The War of Austrian Succession (1740-1748) drained her coffers 
and endangered dwindling shipments to America.  Canadian merchants were receiving 
few and fewer goods each year.  Meanwhile, British merchants received and produced 
Indian trade goods delivered by eager entrepreneurs.  With each year more and more 
tribes formerly limited to the French began trading with the British where they found 
better quality goods for lower prices. 48 
 Initially the Kickapoos rejected the British representatives and remained loyal to 
their French partners in regional dominance.  One French official observed that the 
Kickapoos rejected several British officials on multiple occasions.  He suggested the tribe 
receive rewards for its loyalty.49  A Wea chief confirmed, “My father, the Kickapoos and 
the Mascoutins would not listen to La Tortue and have not been at the council at Great 
Miami River.” 50  A year later, in 1751, a French official recorded, “Only the Kickapoo 
and Mascoutins have been unwilling to receive the English [Wampum] belts.”51  In fact, 
by April 1752 the British had successfully co-opted all the tribes surround the Kickapoos 
and Mascoutins, and yet the two unified tribes remained loyal to the French, even 
protecting a French blacksmith from some raiding Indians.  Of course, that very act may 
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just illustrate the tribe’s loyalties to their access of European goods and services more 
than any specific nation.52  
 While the Kickapoos refused British agents, by 1752 they also turned down 
French requests for support.  A volley of letters penned in April 1752 illustrates the 
changing disposition of the tribe.  One French agent wrote that a “great reliance is not to 
be placed on the Mascoutins, and that their remaining neutral is all that is to be expected 
from them and the Kickapoos.”53  Four days later another official penned, “Nothing 
should be neglected to maintain the Kickapoos and Mascoutins in our interest…”54  By 
the end of the month, Governor Vaudreuil voiced his opinion on the matter, explaining 
that the Kickapoos and Mascoutins were not “ill-intended” toward the French.  His 
instructions were much as the others, to “try to conciliate them or at least to keep them 
neutral in all these events.”55  A few months later, in a letter to the governor, one official 
lamented that the Kickapoos “will not take arms against our enemies, at least [not] unless 
they see us in enough force to do without them.  Then their help will be quite useless to 
us.”56  The Kickapoos saw the tide turning from French to British providers, but were 
slow to choose a side.  Instead the tribe opted to wait out the changing political 
environment to be sure they were not caught on the wrong side. 
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 Kickapoos withdrew from entangling commitments with France as British 
interests in the backcountry magnified.  Trade to the backcountry had long interested 
British merchants, but until France was sufficiently weakened such access was tenuous at 
best.  Indians residing as far west as the Kickapoos, then clustered along the Wabash and 
Illinois Rivers, were certainly out of reach.  Traders were not the only interested British.  
As early as 1745 the Ohio Company organized, intent on surveying, selling, and profiting 
from the backcountry.  In 1745 these Virginia businessmen won a royal charter granting 
them 200,000 acres of trans-Appalachian territory reaching along the Ohio River.   
 Once the French and Indian War began to rage, many Indian Nations were pulled 
into conflict.  Most were located relatively farther east, and those seated deep in the 
backcountry were less apt to be drawn into the conflict.  Many tribes remote to the war 
action took the opportunity to reassert their territorial dominance.  A 1753 report 
observed that the Kickapoos continued their campaigns against their long-time enemies, 
the Chickasaws.57  Two years later, 1754, the Kickapoos officially united with the 
Mascoutins, Pottawattamies and some Sioux to nearly annihilate the Peoria nation.58  
During the following two years, Kickapoos joined with Miamis to engage the Illinois, 
definitively conquering most of present-day Illinois.59  With France’s growing British 
preoccupation (before and during the French and Indian War) smaller tribes of the deep 
backcountry fell victim to Kickapoo expansion once again.  After the 1759 fall of 
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Quebec, and France’s retreat from North America, British soldiers trickled into the 
region’s formerly French posts to find demanding tribes that were well accustomed to 
dealing with Europeans.   
 Despite the formal defeat of France professed by the 1763 Treaty of Paris, many 
French traders remained lodged deep in the backcountry.  Some still worked covertly for 
France, often operating out of St. Louis; others were employed by Spain, who claimed 
everything west of the Mississippi River; still others found employment with Britain.  
Consequently, a variety of diplomatic options re-opened for the Kickapoos and the 
neighboring tribes southwest of the Great Lakes.  Kickapoos were happy to attend 
councils hosted by any nation, and with each conference came ribbons, metals, and other 
gifts.  As Europeans competed for supremacy, Kickapoos would find themselves in a 
unique position to bargain. 
 In 1762 Sir William Johnson dispatched a topographer to council with the tribes 
near Vincennes and to survey the physical and human barriers to settlement.  Hoping the 
Indians would be open to negotiations, he inquired about the “state of the Indians.”  A 
spokesman for the Kickapoos eloquently responded with a speech that set the foundation 
for a new policy towards Europeans.  Kickapoo diplomacy for the next thirty years found 
its roots in this clever address.  The Indian spokesman explained, 
We are very thankful to Sir William Johnson for sending you to enquire 
into the State of the Indians.  We assure you we are rendered very 
miserable at present on Account of a Severe Sickness that has seized 
almost all our people many of which have died lately and many more are 
likely to die….but we think the hardest of, is that the English have never 
so much as given us the least present or even allowed a Smith to be at this 
point to mend our guns, We know very well that other Indian Nations have 
had presents given them at two or three different times and a Smith 
allowed to mend their guns; what those Indians have done to get 
themselves in so great favour with the English we have never heard.  But 
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this we are sure of that we are ready on all occasions to serve our brethren 
the English, and we will advise our young people to behave well— 
If we were to go to the French at the Illinois they would give us some 
ammunition at least, but our brother here has desired us to have as little 
dealings with them as possible, you see we mind what he says as none of 
our people has offered to go near the French since the English came 
here— 
We desire you will acquaint Sir William Johnson with all we have said to 
you, and we hope he will allow a smith at this post and also send some 
presents for our women and children.60 
 
Well-educated by their experiences with the French, the Indians were ready to welcome 
the Europeans back on new terms centered on exploitive demands.  If the Europeans were 
to return, they would serve Indian desires, providing gifts, trade goods and services at 
competitive rates.  And to ensure the flow of gifts, the Kickapoos were happy to remind 
their benefactors of their other Europeans options. 
——— 
 From the mid 17th century until the close of the French and Indian War, the 
Kickapoos increasingly grew exposed to Europeans and sought to navigate a changing 
world of international diplomacy.  First ignoring the French, the Kickapoo later felt 
threatened by their expansion and maneuvered to repel the intruders.  Violent opposition 
gave way to cooperation and shrewd compliance as the French demonstrated their might 
and the benefits of friendship.  Adjusting alliances as necessary to survive, the Kickapoos 
fell into neutrality when the war with Britain distracted France and provided alternate 
sources for European goods.  As the two European powers competed for North America, 
the Kickapoos abstained from the conflict and awaited a victor.   
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 When the French and Indian War ended, Kickapoos enjoyed multiple options for 
European trade.  British traders gradually pressed west along the Ohio River, while 
French traders lingered in the Great Lakes area and on the West side of the Mississippi, a 
region legally transferred to Spain.  Spanish posts would later spring up along that river, 
providing yet a third European power for Kickapoos to trade.  In the pursuit of good 
relations and alliances, all three groups of Europeans competed for Kickapoo friendship 
through gift-giving and generous trade rates.  For the next thirty years, it would be the 
Kickapoos who negotiated from a position of strength as each European power sought to 
win over their loyalty.   
 
 
Malleable Loyalty: Kickapoo Foreign Policy, 1763-1790 
 
Residing in present-day Wisconsin when the French first arrived, the Kickapoos 
faced pressures from the expanding Iroquois and Sioux nations, newly armed with 
European firearms.  Migrating south into present-day Illinois and Indiana, the Kickapoos 
re-asserted their martial strength and extended their territory, obtaining French support 
and dominating neighboring tribes.  Despite an uneasy beginning, Kickapoo-French 
relations strengthened after joint campaigns and the near annihilation of the Fox tribe in 
1730.  Soon after, British merchants penetrated deep into the Old Northwest, likewise 
entreating Natives with their goods and services.  By then, Kickapoos were residing in 
the eastern edges of the Ohio Valley, and they rarely interacted with the European 
newcomers.  British and French competition erupted into the commonly labeled French 
and Indian War, and the French eventually withdrew from the Old Northwest.  Britain 
then erroneously assumed proprietorship over Great Lakes Indian tribes.   
In a short thirty-year period, from the early stages of the French and Indian War 
through the American Revolution, many Indian nations found themselves torn between 
foreign powers and struggling to cope with a rapidly changing world.  The French 
withdrew and the British hoped to dominate the entire backcountry from the Appalachian 
Mountains to the Mississippi River.  While some tribes pledged loyalty to their new 
British “father,” others resisted.  But the oft overlooked Kickapoos found their own way 
to navigate international diplomacy.  They took advantage of changing competitive 
political environments and seized opportunities to strengthen their nation.  Resistant to 
any encroachment, but always willing to pledge promises of loyalty, Kickapoos 
maintained profitable relations with the British, French and Spanish.  During this era 
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typically defined by European competition, Kickapoos consciously pursued their own 
national interests with the imperial would-be “father” nations.  From 1750 to 1780, 
Kickapoo diplomacy took advantage of international politics and constructed malleable 
allegiances with a variety of competing Europeans for the purpose of endearing 
themselves to peace brokers and securing gifts and trade. 
 As settlers, traders, and various Indian tribes came into increasingly close contact, 
each had two choices: they could openly conflict with one another, or they could 
reconcile their differences and interact peacefully.  In large part, this is the very thesis of 
Richard White’s watershed monograph, The Middle Ground.  He argues, “The middle 
ground grew according to the need of people to find a means, other than force, to gain the 
cooperation or consent of foreigners.”  He continues, “Those operating in the middle 
ground acted for interests derived from their own culture, but they had to convince people 
of another culture that some mutual action was fair and legitimate.”1   In White’s well 
accepted interpretation, the middle ground was a geo-cultural region stretching from the 
Appalachian Mountains to the Mississippi River, a region defined by compromise and 
cooperation.  
 To Kickapoos, the middle ground was merely a logistical factor.  They tolerated 
intrusions of Europeans with the furtive intent of manipulating those foreign nations to 
serve their own needs.  Having suffered the afflictions of expanding Sioux and Iroquois 
nations, the Kickapoos migrated southward and sought to dominate present-day Illinois 
and Indiana.  To this end, European allies provided a convenient resource.  Adjusting to a 
new international situation, Kickapoos ensured their territorial dominance in part by 
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securing European support.  Unaware of the relentless advance that would follow, 
Kickapoos allowed Europeans limited access to their lands, tolerating government agents, 
traders, and posts.  The competitive nature of Europeans further empowered the 
Kickapoos, as the tribe played one European nation off against another, switching 
loyalties as necessary to fulfill their purpose of territorial domination—an attribute they 
developed while politicking with the French, Iroquois and Foxes in generations past.   
During the transition from French to British influence in the backcountry, British 
policy underwent significant changes, beginning with the imitation of French gift-giving 
policies.  During the French and Indian War, Britain was shocked by the persistence of 
the French, who were strengthened by their Indian allies.  British superintendent of 
northern Indian Affairs, Sir William Johnson, recalled that the French “spared no labor, 
or expense to gain their [Indian] friendship and esteem, which alone enabled them to 
support the War in these parts so long.”2  To help neutralize French influences among the 
Natives, Britain adopted a similar policy, sending traders, craftsmen, and gifts to the 
tribes of the Old Northwest.  Johnson, and his southern equivalent, Edward Atkin, 
eagerly agreed to the new Indian relations system.  From November 1758 to December 
1759, Johnson alone spent £17,072 on Indian gifts.3   
 The new policy was well received by Indians.  Delawares and Iroquois were 
among the first to benefit from the policy, and Ohio Indians  did soon after.  Indians 
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readily accepted British endowments, and many Natives looked forward to a new 
prosperous relationship.  Attending a British council, one Delaware chief explained,  
Brethren, we let you know, that the French have used our people kindly, in 
every respect; they have used them like gentlemen….So they have treated the 
chiefs.  Now we desire you to be strong; we with you would take the same 
method, and use our people well.4   
 
 Kickapoos also prospered from this generous policy, which came at an ideal time.  
Beginning with General Edward Braddock’s 1754 victories in the backcountry, French 
armies (and their gifts) gradually withdrew from the Ohio River Valley.  By 1760 the 
official French forces abandoned the region entirely, consolidating farther north.  Though 
Kickapoos previously fought along side the French as allies, jointly conquering the 
Cahokia, Peoria and Illinois Indians and repeatedly expelling British intruders, the tribe 
was happy to attend British councils and receive free gifts.  Eager to supplant the French, 
Johnson organized repeated gift-giving councils to develop friendly relations with distant 
tribes.  Kickapoos attended four such councils at Fort Pitt between November 1759 and 
August 1760.5  And though they missed a fifth opportunity in September 1760, the tribe 
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sent a message indicating that they approved of the conference.6  Nevertheless, when 
later confronted by France’s Illinois administrator Saint-Ange, Kickapoos expressed 
equal fidelity and support to France.  Saint-Ange noted that “they all preferred dying to 
making peace with the British.”7 
Respect for the boundaries of Indian lands remained the primary interest of most 
tribes gathered at British councils, particularly the Iroquois and Delawares.  For 
Kickapoos, this issue was not yet as pressing, but in time they too would center all 
council discussion on the topic of territorial boundaries.  Sir William Johnson tried to 
placate Native concerns.   His correspondences demonstrate he fully understood the need 
to delineate the increasingly blurred borders of purlieus Indian territories during the post-
war period.  Johnson advocated “clear and fixed boundaries between our settlements and 
their hunting grounds,” though just where these boundaries would be he never told the 
indigenous residents.8  But in the interim, his guarantees comforted Indians attending the 
British councils.   
 Near the close of the French and Indian War, Jeffrey Amherst ascended the ranks 
to become Commander-in-Chief over all British forces in North America.  Overseeing 
the war’s final victories and the defeat of the French, Amherst believed Britain was 
sufficiently entrenched to begin administering North America with an imperial hand.  He 
felt that the Indians were of “little consequence,” and he deplored the policy of frequent 
                                                 
6 “Council of Proceedings, September 15, 1760,” Pennsylvania Colonial Records, 
vol. 8, 497-500, OVGLE Archive; Elbert Walker, “Forts of the American Frontier,” 
Reports of the Illinois State Historical Society (1928), 204, OVGLE Archive. 
7 “Saint-Ange to Deboddi, July 15, 1764,” Illinois Historical Society Collections, 
vol. 10, 289, OVGLE Archive. 
8 “Johnson to Denny, July 21, 1758,” The Papers of Sir William Johnson, vol. 2, 
p. 879, White, Middle Ground, p. 248. 
 47
gift-giving.  Beginning in 1761, Amherst dispatched a volley of letters to Johnson, Atkin 
and others, formally abolishing the practice of Indian “indulgence.”  Indians would not 
receive gifts to encourage allegiance, but were simply expected to accept Britain as their 
liege.  The only European items Indians should receive, Amherst felt, were those earned 
through Native trade and industrious labor.  Any resistors to British imperialism would be 
coerced by military repercussions.  Amherst explained, “purchasing the good behavior, 
either of Indians or any others is what I do not understand; when men of what race soever 
behave ill, they must be punished but not bribed.”9   
 Sir Johnson immediately lamented Amherst’s iron fist policy.  The superintendent 
questioned the effects of retracting Britain’s once generous assistance.  Most poignantly, 
he feared that residual Frenchmen in the distant frontier would find renewed Indian 
support without competitive British gift-giving.  Sir Johnson wrote,  
We, as either not thinking of them of sufficient consequence, or that we had 
not so much occasion for their assistance not only fell infinitely short of the 
Enemy in our presents &ca to the Indians, but have of late I am 
apprehensive been rather premature in our sudden retrenchment of some 
necessary expenses, to which they have been always accustomed.10 
 
Johnson anticipated that Indians would befriend those who addressed them with 
generosity; he felt Amherst’s plan was more likely to disparage Indians from British 
fidelity than incorporate them into an imagined British model of free trade and peace. 
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INDIAN RELATIONS   
At the close of the French and Indian War, the Great Lakes region underwent a 
tumultuous crisis.  Many tribes allied to the French suffered under the advance of British 
military forces.  French and British goods undermined traditional labor and production; 
under Amherst’s policy, those products suddenly became less accessible.  Even so, 
Indians found access to one European item—alcohol.  The fire water swept the 
backcountry, disrupting daily village life.  Further destabilizing Indian nations, British 
agents seized opportunities to press treaties with fractured tribal alliances.  Unity forged 
by respected chiefs collapsed along with their influence and authority, undermined by 
forced British conciliation.  Anomic responses usurped tribal leadership and many young 
warriors lost faith in long-standing social norms as they turned to alternative coping 
measures—often alcohol.  Many tribes, particularly in the Ohio Valley, fell into 
disarray.11   
Revitalization movements rapidly swept the region, as Indians gathered at Detroit, 
the upper Ohio Valley, the western Ohio Valley, and the Seneca town of Chnussio.  
Perhaps the largest and most influential of these movements was led by Pontiac.  The 
charismatic Ottawa leader grew up among powerful Delaware shamans and prophets, 
many of whom deplored European influences.  In addition to his spiritual background, 
Pontiac understood the value of Indian unity.  Delawares long enjoyed cooperation with 
the Ottawas, Pottawattamies, Huron-Petuns, Chippewas, Ojibwas, and Wyandots.  As 
French forces withdrew, Pontiac combined religious and military ideas to organize an 
anti-British coalition.  His alliance, joined by some Kickapoos, rejected British 
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dominance and resisted the new, heavy-handed policy.  Indians thrashed the backcountry 
in 1763, attacking a dozen British posts.   
 The chaos of the backcountry, and particularly in the Ohio River Valley, did not 
have equally disruptive impacts for Kickapoos.  Far from isolated, the Kickapoos were 
well aware of the French withdrawal, changing British policies, tumultuous Indian 
communities and revitalization movements.  Designed to reinvigorate traditional values 
with new political and religious infusions, revitalization movements are a hallmark of 
European dominated Native history.  They represent both cultural despair and hope 
through the realignment of tradition.  During the French and Indian War the Kickapoos 
rarely participated in the European conflict, only occasionally cooperating with Pontiac.  
They generally seemed a safe distance from British cultural assault, residing along the 
Wabash and down to St. Louis at the confluence of the Mississippi and Missouri. 
Originally founded by French traders, St. Louis was legally transferred to Spanish 
control at the close of the French and Indian War.  Nevertheless, it remained a village 
populated by Frenchmen and traders who continued the old ways of Indian gift-giving 
and maintenance of cooperative relations with the Kickapoos.  Furthermore, as their part 
of that relationship, Kickapoo warriors often obstructed and even raided competing 
British representatives and merchants.  In this way Kickapoos both appeased gift-giving 
French agents and traders and profited by raiding British merchants.  On one such 
occasion in 1764, Kickapoo warriors repulsed British Captain Thomas Morris en route to 
Niagara where he intended to host a grand Indian conference.12  Furious with the 
obstruction, Sir William Johnson blamed French agents and traders, whom he believed 
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enticed the Kickapoos to erect “so many artifices to obstruct our interests in the Country, 
that it is likely to become a very expensive and troublesome affair.”  Kickapoos had 
learned from their relations with the French only a generation earlier that stubborn 
resistance could lead to European capitulation and consequent gift-giving.  If not, the 
spoils of regular raids would suffice.  Either way, for the British, Kickapoo relations 
promised to become an “expensive affair.”13 
 During this era of tribal political realignments and Indian social upheaval, 
Kickapoos remained lodged deep in the backcountry, seemingly immune to most of the 
French and Indian War’s consequences.  The tribe busily managed foreign relations with 
multiple Indian nations.  They continued affable relations with the Pottawattamies, 
Piankashaws, Miamis and other tribes.  Their long time friends, the Mascoutins, 
disappeared from the historical record, probably absorbed into the growing Kickapoo 
nation.  Expanding south and east, Kickapoos overran the tribes of the Illinois region.  
Kickapoos also organized frequent raids to the south and west against the Chickasaws, 
Choctaws, and Osages, while simultaneously defending against the nearly conquered 
Peorias and other remnant tribes.  Even still, residual Iroquois attacks threatened 
Kickapoo domination even as far southwest as the Wabash and Illinois River valleys.14 
 Despite their removal from the backcountry turmoil spawned by the French 
defeat, the Kickapoos’ culture underwent a significant change at the close of the French 
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and Indian War.  Predisposed to decentralization on a macro-scale of raiding and warfare 
(the tribe was notorious for dividing its forces in battle), the Kickapoos fractured into 
three distinct bands in the mid 1760’s.  In earlier generations, the semi-unified Kickapoo 
bands resided throughout the Wabash River Valley and Peoria Lake region, and at times 
as far south as St. Louis.  But in 1765, seventy-five Kickapoo warriors and their families 
followed Chief Serena, migrating further southwest in a definitive division that continues 
today.  Just as Sir William Johnson feared, Spanish influences had attracted the band.  
They established a new village thirty-six miles below St. Louis, geographically 
distancing themselves from the social turbulence occurring in the Great Lakes and Ohio 
Valley regions.  Meanwhile, two other Kickapoo bands coalesced on the lower Illinois 
prairies and Wabash Rivers respectively, each consisting of about three hundred warriors 
and their families.  From this time forward, the latter two bands were spoken of 
separately as the Prairie and Wabash bands.15  This division, innocuous at first, generated 
far reaching effects, eventually resulting in drastically different bands.  However, in 
1765, each only embarked on this divergent course of cultural adaptation.  And for the 
remainder of the 18th century, all three bands enjoyed regular communication, frequent 
exchanges, cultural and even occasional political unity.  
 
BRITISH RELATIONS 
The British were shocked by the costs of the Indian uprisings of 1763, having 
suffered attacks at Detroit, St. Joseph, Miami, Ouiatanon, Michelimakinak, Green Bay, 
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Sandusky, Le Boeuf, Venango, Presque Isle, and Pitt, as well as along Forbes’ highway 
into the Ohio Valley.  Garrisoning soldiers sufficient to control the region would be 
expensive.  The crown estimated the annual cost of maintaining the two dozen recently 
captured French inland posts from £300,000 to £400,000; a fearful expense when added 
to the already daunting costs of the French and Indian War.16  Interpreting Far West 
settlement as an unnecessary and risky enterprise, Britain ordered the evacuation of the 
trans-Appalachian backcountry, declaring the Proclamation Line of 1763.  In so doing, 
the crown effectively withdrew all British authority from the region as well, leaving no 
system for governing or protecting those Europeans who recklessly crossed the imaginary 
line. 
 Viewing the backcountry with a radically different lens than officials, British 
settlers and merchants perceived the West as an opportunity for profit.  One such trader 
was George Croghan, whose experiences well-illustrate the motivations of encroaching 
settlers and merchants, as well as the typical response of Kickapoos.  Croghan was a 
member of the Ohio Company, a corporation established by King George in 1749.  The 
company’s purpose was to settle the West, and elite Virginian founding members 
expected to profit nicely from trade and land acquisitions leading to settlements in the 
region.  Beginning in the 1740’s, Croghan organized frequent backcountry excursions, 
regularly consisting of over a hundred pack animals and two dozen men.17  Beginning in 
1756, he functioned as both an independent entrepreneur and as Deputy Indian 
Superintendent under Sir William Johnson. 
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As he had many times before, Croghan organized an expedition into the trans-
Appalachian backcountry in 1765.  Led by Shawnee, Delaware and Iroquois guides, 
Croghan penetrated deeper than on previous journeys, and in early June he found himself 
well beyond the protection of British posts.  Croghan’s journal entry for the 8th of June 
explained, 
At Day Break we were attacked by a Party of Indians consisting 
of Eighty warriors of the Kickapoos and Mascoutins who killed 
two of my men & three Indians wounded myself and all the rest 
of my party except two White Men and one Indian then made 
myself and all the White men prisoners plundering us of 
everything we had.18    
 
Pillaging and murdering his party, the Kickapoos terrified Croghan.  Perhaps they once 
seemed little more than mythical marauders hidden deep in the interior; but now he was 
face-to-face with a serious opponent.  To save his life, one of the Shawnees interceded, 
threatening the Kickapoos with Shawnee retribution should Croghan die.  Whether or not 
the threat was genuine, the young Kickapoo warriors dared not press the issue, most 
especially because this particular raid was not approved by tribal elders, although French 
agents regularly encouraged hostility towards the British.  Even more importantly, the 
loyalty of Croghan’s Indian guides testified to his value as an alliance broker.  The 
British-allied Iroquois’ raids particularly threatened the Kickapoos Wabash Valley 
dominance.  Treading on dangerous waters, the Kickapoos resolved to march the captive 
merchants through “thick woody country” and on to Vincennes.19 
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 On June 15, 1765, the caravan arrived in Vincennes.   The village had technically 
passed into British control under the 1763 Treaty of Paris; however, in all reality it 
remained a mixed French and intertribal enclave, enjoying regular trade and political 
relations with the French and Spanish at St. Louis, just across the Mississippi River.  
Vincennes epitomized White’s middle ground—it was a place of mediation and 
cooperation.  While passing through, a Piankashaw man addressed the Kickapoos, 
scolding the young warriors for their overzealous attack.  Sure that Croghan (and his 
interpreters) could overhear, the Piankashaw leader reminded Kickapoo warriors of their 
efforts to maintain good relations with the British.  He also insisted that the captives’ 
wounds should receive prompt treatment.  Kickapoos and other Indians gathered, and 
after discretely discussing the preceding events, concluded that Croghan was a valuable 
tool.  Not only could he serve to mitigate Iroquois raids and guarantee against future 
Shawnee attacks, the indebted appreciation of an influential trader could additionally 
develop into material wealth.20  To this end, the Indians feigned regret and pleaded for 
forgiveness.   
Equally interested in maintaining peaceful relations in the backcountry, Croghan 
accepted the apology.  A keen businessman, he took the opportunity to hold a council 
with the Vincennes and neighboring tribes (Mascoutins, Kickapoos, Wea, Ottawas, 
Piankashaws and Twightwees) as well as Shawnees, Delawares and Iroquois.  At the 
council, a Kickapoo chief named Wolf began discussions by formally apologizing, 
We the Mascoutins, Kickapoos, and Ouiatonons [Wea], had a pipe of Peace, 
which we all used to smoke out of, with our Brethren of all Nations.  This 
pipe we have now broke, by the Action we have committed…. In breaking 
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our pipe of Peace, we hurt our own heads very much, and we now send you 
this pipe in [its] place, to smoke out of it, and we desire you will have pity on 
us, and make up this difference, that our Women & Children may live in 
Peace.  We assure you, that when we struck you, the Hatchet turned in our 
hand, and since we have repented very much, what we have done.  Brethren, 
In Striking you, we have struck our selves.21 
 
The chief went on to rationalize his failure to establish peace earlier.  He claimed it was 
always their intent, but that they believed French representatives were taking that 
message to the British.  He explained, “the reason we don’t go to beg forgiveness of you 
directly is that our Fathers the French … promises to help us to settle this unhappy 
difference with you.”22  Perceiving that Croghan accepted the apology, the Indians 
introduced the true purpose for the pretended peace.  After all, Indians were not without 
their own motivations.  Often suffering raids from British-allied nations, a Wea chief 
pleaded, 
Brother, we now beg you will pity our folly, & likewise use your influence 
with the Shawnees, Delawares, and Six Nations, to settle this unhappy 
difference between us, we know you have it in your power, if you please.23 
 
Croghan was happy to mediate between the tribes.  Unaware of deep running rivalries, 
Croghan ignorantly imagined his little council would establish lasting peace between 
Indians and Europeans, and pave the way for British-welcomed expansion into the 
backcountry.  Kickapoos and other Vincennes Indians, on the other hand, simply hoped 
the European could taper Iroquois raids and deliver trade goods.   
Anxious to seal the deal, Croghan paid little attention to the Vincennes Indians 
concerns over land—an issue he knew would raise difficult questions.  He gave no 
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indication of his corporate incentives or the Virginian elites’ designs on the Ohio Valley.  
Croghan simply secured peaceful pledges from the tribes represented.  Quite pleased with 
himself, he returned to Virginia, boasting that he had reconciled Vincennes Indians to the 
crown.24   While the British believed they had obtained Indians allegiances, the 
Kickapoos were likewise happy, sure that they had secured once again an ally possibly to 
exploit for processed goods and political influence.  
 In the East, Ohio Company executives, Virginian elites, land speculators and 
settlers all looked west.  Under such pressures, New Hampshire Governor Benning 
Wentworth ordered his colony’s western tracts surveyed, divided, and opened to sale and 
settlement.  In 1763 the Massachusetts General Court similarly opened lands in present-
day Maine.25  Europeans unsociable hunger for land turned their eyes ever westward.  In 
that same year King George issued the Proclamation Line in an attempt to restrain 
western expansion, retain control over colonists, and limit administrative expenses in the 
Indian dominated backcountry.   
In 1768, Wills Hill, the Viscount of Hillsborough and secretary to the crown, 
called for the Proclamation Line of 1763 to be redrawn.  His intention was to adjust the 
line east and west where appropriate to reflect realistic physical barriers and markers.  
William Johnson hosted this treaty conference at Fort Stanwix; some 2,200 Indians 
attended, primarily Iroquois, Shawnees, and Delawares.  At Stanwix, Johnson 
overstepped his authority, and instead of neatly adjusting the line, he pushed it out to the 
Ohio River.  This was made possible by Johnson’s liberal delineation of Iroquois 
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boundaries well beyond their actual dominion, particularly along the Ohio River.  
Immediately after the treaty, land speculation companies promptly claimed the territory.  
The largest and most successful of these was the Walpole Company, which had recently 
absorbed the Ohio Company and its interests.  Settlers quickly responded to the new 
opportunities.  By 1772, 30,000 colonists lived in the Ohio region and were joined by a 
constant migration of 5,000 British families each year for the next decade.26   
 Unaware that the flood gates of British settlement were irreversibly swinging 
open, Kickapoos continued to cultivate positive relations with the British, fully intending 
to exploit representatives as they had prior European agents.  In 1765 the tribe not only 
promised peace to Croghan, but Kickapoo Chief Majawabia and nine warriors attended 
an British conference in Detroit where they again pledged their loyalty in exchange for 
gifts.27  In the fall of 1767, Kickapoos met with the British, represented once more by 
Deputy Indian Superintendent Croghan.  Not simply now a government official, Croghan 
sought to advance the interests of the Walpole Company: burgeoning Indian trade and 
eventual land cessations.  In a letter to a potential Walpole investor, Benjamin Franklin, 
Croghan explained that with proper handling the Kickapoos and other Wabash tribes 
could be pacified.  He informed Franklin that such nations primarily sought two goals: 
British guarantee against encroaching settlers and the ready presence of traders and goods 
in the backcountry.28  Seeking these conditions, the tribe pledged their fidelity yet again 
at Croghan’s 1767 peace council.  Ignorantly, Croghan believed he had successfully 
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attracted a “western confederacy” to the crown.29  In reality, Kickapoos never interpreted 
their agreements with Britain as a monogamous relationship, and they certainly would 
not permit encroaching settlers just across the Ohio. 
 Kickapoo pretension to British loyalty was spurious.  Kickapoos eagerly attended 
British councils and accepted trinkets permitted by Amherst, but they were quick to 
complain about the decreasing quality of British gifts, and when opportunities to loot 
British traders and soldiers arose, Kickapoo warriors acted much as before.  When fifteen 
British men traveled up the Shawnee River, a group of Indians raided the ship and 
murdered the men, save one who was out hunting.  That survivor made his way to Fort 
Chartres, the British-occupied former French fort located on the Mississippi eighteen 
miles north of Kaskaskia.  There he related the event to commanding officer Captain 
Gordon Forbes.  Suspecting Kickapoos, Forbes passed a report along to Captain George 
Turnbull at Fort Detroit.  Summarizing Forbes’s report, Turnbull forwarded the news 
along to General Thomas Gage, adding that he likewise suspected Kickapoos for several 
reasons.  Turnbull lamented, “What a pity it is we can get no proof against such villains.  
They will not be quieted until they are chastised.”30  The British were equally suspicious 
of their truce partners. 
 While sometimes halting trade, seizing goods, and murdering intruders, 
Kickapoos appeased British authorities with apologies and promises of allegiance.   
Addressing British agent John Wilkins, “They acknowledge that their young men had 
struck the British through bad advice but were now heartily sorry.”  Further, the 
                                                 
29 “George Croghan to Thomas Gage, New York, January 16, 1767,” Gage 
Papers, American Series, vol. 61, OVGLE Archive. 
30 “George Turnbull to Thomas Gage, Detroit, September 11, 1768.” Gage 
Papers, American Series, OVGLE Archive. 
 59
Kickapoos told Wilkins that they feared to approach British posts, as they had heard 
Captain Forbes was anxious to lock them up in irons.31  Little did Wilkins know that the 
Kickapoos were manipulating him just as they had other Europeans.  Anxious to resolve 
the apparent rift, Wilkins offered up three gallon-kegs of rum, ten pounds of powder, 
twenty pounds of lead, a pound of vermillion, four carrots of tobacco, and other supplies.  
Three weeks later Wilkins distributed another gallon keg of rum, three pounds of powder, 
six pounds of lead, three more carrots of tobacco and additional supplies.32  Once again, 
the Kickapoos profited.   
Three months later Kickapoos visited Wilkins in yet another scene that illustrates 
the success of Kickapoo diplomacy.  Among other tribes, Chickasaws continued to resist 
the British.  Hoping to turn neutral tribes against the resistors, the crown began 
purchasing Chickasaw scalps from neighboring tribes.  Returning from a raid in March of 
1769, a party of Kickapoos approached Wilkins, offered him two scalps which they 
claimed were Chickasaws.  Optimistically believing that his previous mediation 
facilitated a blossoming Kickapoo alliance, the agent enthusiastically purchased the 
scalps.  To Wilkins, the exchange surely validated his earlier gifts and diplomatic efforts 
to smooth over Kickapoo relations.  Now it seemed the tribe was falling in line, 
performing the mercenary duties desired by the Crown.   
But the Kickapoos were hardly enamored with the British.  Their inspiration for 
anti-Chickasaw raids ran far deeper than any Europeans’ designs.  In fact, Kickapoos had 
long been at war with Chickasaws and were happy to receive payment for deeds 
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performed independently of British purposes, assuming the scalps were even from 
Chickasaws.  Before leaving, Kickapoos applied one other manipulative tactic, 
complaining that their rum had been stolen by hostile Indians.  It was worth a try; 
Wilkins had gullibly given in to their pleas several times before.  But this time the agent 
did not supply any additional gifts.33 
 
SPANISH RELATIONS 
The British were not the only nation with whom the Kickapoos interacted.  Spain 
enjoyed a long history in the New World, and it extended Spanish influence up the 
Mississippi River as France withdrew.  Realizing the eminence of defeat, France 
maneuvered to limit Britain’s spoils of war.  Just before the 1763 Treaty of Paris formally 
ended the French and Indian War, France surrendered New Orleans and any trans-
Mississippi holdings to Spain in the 1762 Treaty of Fontainebleau.  Spanish Governor 
Antonio de Ulloa was speedily dispatched to the little village of New Orleans, from 
whence he managed Spanish Louisiana.  But Spain was slow to invest in the region, 
essentially viewing it as little more than a buffer for the valued colonies in the American 
Southwest.  After some time, Spain did attempt to establish a presence in the Northwest, 
and even envisioned a glorious string of posts stretching from the Gulf of Mexico to St. 
Louis and along the Missouri to the Pacific Ocean.  But with the failures of the Missouri 
Company expeditions in the mid 1790’s, Spain grudgingly abandoned those short-lived 
ambitions.   
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 New Orleans hosted the governing seat of authority for all of Spanish Louisiana, 
and Spanish representatives slowly filled other former French posts along the west side of 
the Mississippi River.  By 1788, St. Louis administrator Don Manuel Perez sought to 
strengthen relations with local Indians.  He wrote to his superior in New Orleans, Count 
Bernardo de Galvaz, requesting funds to establish new trading posts and increased Indian 
gift-giving.  The proposal was rejected, as Spain had only haphazardly acquired the 
region and now had no interests in it beyond its use as a buffer.34  But Perez’s aspirations 
were not forgotten entirely.  In 1791, Francisco Luis Hector Carondelet succeeded 
Galvez, and quickly swept Spanish Louisiana with reforms.  Among them, Carondelet 
encouraged trade with Indians, organizing the Missouri Company and sent traders up that 
river.  It was Carondelet who envisioned a grand network of Spanish posts bridging New 
Orleans, St. Louis, and the Pacific Coast.  As with the French and British, gift-giving and 
Indian supplication became an essential part of Spanish policy along the Mississippi.35 
 Kickapoos living near St. Louis immediately profited from Spanish intentions.  
As early as March 1769 an early Spanish report listed the tribe among seventeen 
neighboring nations receiving Spanish gifts.36  Again in May, the Kickapoo nation was 
listed among twenty-three tribes on the Spanish payroll.37  In October, a Spanish agent 
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commented on the already “established customs” of Indian relations.  Don Pedro Piemas, 
stationed at Fort Don Carlos (near St. Louis), explained:  
In that short time of my residence in that post there came to hold discussions 
[with] the tribes of Osages, Iowas, Kickapoos, Mascoutins, Pou, Potawatomi, 
Ottawas, Piankashaws, Foxes, and the others of the vicinity attracted both by 
novelty of the arrival of a new commandant in order to receive their present 
which is necessary by established customs… 38  
 
This system of Spanish gift-giving and trading with Kickapoos, as well as other tribes, 
served to maintain good relations in politics and a growing trade.  In addition to receiving 
gifts, Kickapoos and other Indians enjoyed favorable trade relations with the fur hungry 
Spanish.  Those traders were instructed to offer gifts and trade rates so generous that the 
Indians would be “assured that they are indispensable.” 39 
However, positive Indian relations were not without economic costs.  The 
Spanish treasury absorbed the expenses of the gift-giving and trade policy, and the costs 
of gifts and generous trade margins were not the only expense.  Indian visitors often 
stayed at Spanish posts, and according to Piemas, “It is the King who bears the expenses 
of the Indians maintenance during their stay in the village, and he makes no profit from 
it.”  To make such visits more affordable, Governor Ulloa ordered Piemas to concentrate 
small envoys into a single multi-tribe gathering at Fort of San Carlos, as it “was distant 
from the settlements their stay should be but in passing, and, consequently, there would 
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be a great saving of food, whose consumption has hitherto been considerable, and 
therefore costly.40 
 Governor Ulloa planned to create a Spanish-led hegemony of tribes, providing 
Spain the luxuries of the fur trade and protecting Spanish borders against European and 
Indian trans-Mississippi encroachment.  As part of Ulloa’s campaign to attract Indian 
allies, Kickapoos were encouraged to relocate south of St. Louis into Spanish domain.  
Many Kickapoos were dissatisfied with Britain’s recent preeminence in the Northwest 
and the anomic crisis it caused, as well as the declining supply of gifts.  Kickapoo Chief 
Serena accepted Spain’s invitation.  In 1765, Ulloa secured a land grant from Spanish 
Emperor Carlos III, promising the Kickapoos tracts between the Sabine River and San 
Antonio.  Within two years, those lands were exchanged for territories further southeast, 
as Spain consolidated control over Coahuila (then encompassing present-day Texas as 
well as the state’s borders within Mexico).  In exchange for these lands, Kickapoos 
pledged to defend the Spanish territories against hostile Indians, particularly Osages and 
Chickasaws, both historic rivals of the Kickapoos.  The tribe was happy to receive 
Spanish support to engage their long hated enemies.   
 The transition proved complicated.  While some Kickapoos journeyed further 
southwest, raiding Indians hostile to Spain, others remained in the Illinois prairie and 
along the Wabash.  These Kickapoos also interacted with Spanish agents, though living 
in a territory theoretically “owned” by Britain.  In 1770, the Spanish lieutenant-governor 
at St. Louis received instructions to provide New Orleans with a complete list of Indian-
desired gifts.  These items were then shipped up the Mississippi to the Illinois region in 
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large annual convoys.  From St. Louis the gifts and trade items were distributed 
throughout the region and up the Ohio River.  Through these measures, Spain hoped to 
strengthen ties and meet all tribal needs, eliminating any Indian motivations for friendly 
British relations.41  Kickapoos along the lower Illinois and Wabash Rivers benefited from 
Spanish gift-giving and trade while sporadically attending British councils as well.  In 
exchange for Spanish gifts, the Wabash and/or Prairie Kickapoos also intensified their 
raids against their long-time enemies, the Chickasaws.  These Kickapoo bands were so 
effective that in 1772, Chickasaw chief Panimataja arrived at St. Louis to plead with 
Lieutenant-Governor Francisco Cruzat, specifically requesting he call off the Kickapoo 
marauders.  Enjoying the spoils of war, however, the Kickapoos were not easily 
tempered.42   
Meanwhile, additional Kickapoos continued to migrate farther southwest, 
likewise overrunning Indian tribes hostile to Spanish authority.  By 1784, Kickapoo 
mercenaries successfully expelled Chickasaws and other tribes from the lands 
surrounding Galvez.  On February 15, 1784, in New Orleans, Governor Count de Galvez 
endowed Kickapoo Chief Pemwetamwa of the Southwest band with a silver medal four 
times the size typically distributed by the British and French.  Inscribed were the words, 
“Al Mérito” or “To the Merit,” certifying their role as border patrollers and more 
importantly—their special status as prized mercenaries.  From 1767 to 1824, these 
Southwest Kickapoos traversed much of the Gulf coast, engaging “savage hordes” that 
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opposed the Spanish crown.  These Southwest Kickapoos inherited massive tracts of 
land, special status, and Spanish support, all in exchange for maintaining their traditional 
ways of life in a new area.43 
 
KICKAPOOS INDEPENDENCE REVEALED 
 If the British truly participated in the Kickapoos’ system of exploitation while 
unaware of the tribe’s mixed allegiances, that blissful ignorance came to a screeching halt 
in the early 1770’s.  British agent Alexander McKee met with some Shawnees in the 
summer of 1771.  According to McKee’s Shawnee informants, the Wabash tribes 
(including the Kickapoos) secretly resented the British, and they accused the crown of 
neglect.  More disturbing, the Shawnees told McKee that Kickapoos had invited the 
French to return and build forts in their territory, “round all their villages.”  The 
Shawnees even reported that the Wabash Kickapoos participated in raids against British 
posts.44  The report made its way up the chain of command, from McKee to Sir William 
Johnson, and eventually to General Johnson Hall Gage, the commander of British forces 
in North America during the American war for Independence.  The report on Gage’s 
desk, penned by Johnson, shared the opinion that “most of the tribes about the Wabash as 
well as some on the Ohio &c[ompany], are inclinable to commit hostilities and that the 
young warriors of the nations may join them is extremely probable.”45   
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 Within a few months, Gage received another report confirming the Kickapoos’ 
disregard for the British.  In July of 1771, eight Wabash Kickapoos captured a British 
man from the Bayton and Company plantation, located near Fort Chartres.  The man was 
taken into captivity; his horse stolen.  They marched the Brit to their town along the 
Wabash River, then stripped him, painted him black, and convinced him he would be 
burned alive.  The captive later recounted, 
The next day they lighted a fire, bound & laid me before it, and were 
proceeding to exercise the most cruel torture on me, when some French 
traders from Detroit, touched with compassion, interceded for my life, which 
after two days consultation, the savages agreed to allow, on the payment of a 
very great ransom; which with my expenses in return here & will cost about 
three hundred pounds.46 
 
The French traders interceded, but not without offering the Kickapoos payment for their 
prize.  In the minds of the Kickapoos, they once again demonstrated reasonable 
cooperation and compassion while turning a significant profit at the expense of 
Europeans.  The liberated captive explained that the Kickapoos had raided the same 
plantation two months earlier, killing two men.  Additionally, he reported that these 
Indians were “fully bent on war against the English,” and that a group of forty warriors 
were in route to intercept a British boat carrying military supplies along the Ohio.47 
Perhaps more disturbing to Gage than the Kickapoo belligerence was the presence 
and influence of French traders in the backcountry.  William Johnson shared those 
concerns.  He increasingly distrusted the Kickapoos and their Wabash confederacy of 
conquered and allied tribes.  The Kickapoos struck at the British from the safety of their 
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deep backcountry homelands.  Lamenting the frequent attacks, Sir Johnson ascribed 
“their murders and robberies,” to the “jealousy of French traders, and to that nation on the 
Wabash who are daily increasing in numbers.”  Sir Johnson continued, “The injuries 
which our own traders sustain to the South West-ward thro’ the superior influence and 
artifices of the French … is likewise worthy [of] serious attention.”  Just as before, the 
Kickapoos attempted to smooth over the conflict with “complaints made daily… of the 
abuses & irregularities of trade.”  But Sir Johnson now interpreted the Kickapoos’ policy 
as duplicitous exploitation, and he refused to cooperate.  But without British generosity 
towards the Wabash tribes, Sir Johnson predicted another rebellion in the backcountry, 
much like that of 1763.  He expected the Kickapoos complaints would “be made use of 
by them in case of a defection in any quarter.”  Sir Johnson had finally realized that the 
Kickapoos felt no genuine loyalty to Britain.48 
 From Britain’s perspective, managing the Kickapoos and the Wabash Valley 
seemed to be spiraling out of control.  In reality, the British never had control.  Once 
again, in 1772 eleven Wabash Kickapoos captured two British men, and demanded 120 
pounds as payment for their lives.49  In that same year Sir William Johnson called for an 
Indian council, but the Kickapoos and Piankashaws chose not to attend, perhaps aware 
that the game was up.50  Thomas Gage, frustrated with the Kickapoos pugnacious 
attitude, finally unleashed the Iroquois on them, encouraging the Iroquois to chastise the 
Kickapoos and Pottawattamies.  As ordered, in 1773 the Iroquois raided the Wabash, 
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killing half a dozen Indians.  Such tactics, combined with the threat of full scale war, 
reassured Gage that the Kickapoos would learn to respect British authority.51  To further 
entice the menacing tribe, Britain dispatched agents to distribute wampum belts among 
Kickapoos, Delawares, and all tribes of the Wabash confederacy.  The belts carried a 
recommendation “to remain in peace,” and served “to inform them that though their great 
friend [the French] is dead, the council-fire kindled by the English and them continues to 
burn as bright as ever.”52 
But General Gage, Johnson, and all the British agents knew French influence was 
not dead, nor was that of the Spanish.  French traders and Spanish diplomatic agents 
continued to navigate the backcountry, attempting to monopolize the Kickapoos’ (and 
other tribes) friendship, and turning them away from British competitors.  In a letter to 
Quebec Governor Fredrick Haldimand, General Gage observed, 
It has very often been reported that the French and Spaniards have excited 
the nations against the English, and been the authors of many mischiefs, tho’ 
it has not been discovered that the Spanish Government has had any concern 
therin.  But it is probable that … Spanish subjects have been guilty of such 
iniquitous practices to keep the trade to themselves.53 
 
Still, no foreign nation could reasonably expect the Kickapoo unmitigated support.  
While the tribe did hold a warmer affinity towards the French than British, they were not 
above trading and attending councils with the latter.  In 1777, Kickapoos who maintained 
frequent relations with French merchants gave notice of their intentions to rekindle trade 
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with British merchants.  This simple interchange signaled declining French influence 
among the tribe; with the French unable to meet their needs, the Kickapoos had to look 
elsewhere for trade goods and gifts.  Secondly, it also represents one of the tribe’s final 
attempts to exploit goods from the French, whom they hoped would compete for the 
Kickapoos allegiance once more.54  Though French influence was waning, the Spanish 
still provided an alternative to the British, allowing the Kickapoos’ system of diplomacy 
to continue to function sporadically despite declining French trade.  But Spain too was 
withdrawing from the Louisiana territory, and encouraging the Kickapoos to join them 
southwest of the Mississippi.  Additionally, Spanish authorities advised the Kickapoos 
“not to mix themselves with the troubles of the Bostonians [nor] with the English.”55  The 
Kickapoos soon found themselves devoid of their former European benefactors but faced 
with a new unsuspecting “ally” to exploit. 
 
EURO-AMERICAN COLONIST RELATIONS 
Along the Atlantic seaboard, British colonists were undergoing their own social 
upheaval.  In 1765 Britain passed the Stamp Act; the Boston Tea Party occurred in 1773; 
and by 1775 colonial minutemen engaged British soldiers at Lexington and Concord.  
Initially, France and Spain stood aloof and encouraged Indians to do the same.  
Eventually though, European powers and Indian nations alike were drawn into the 
conflict. 
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 The immerging European-American nation understood the potential impact of 
Indian allegiances.  As early as 1776, patriot settlers south of the Ohio proclaimed the 
need to appease and even enlist Indians to the revolutionary cause.  In a petition to 
Virginia, they explained that the British were already rallying Natives against the 
colonists.  It explained,  
And as at this time of general danger, we cannot take too much precaution to 
prevent the inroads of the savages, & prevent the effusion of innocent blood, 
we, the Committee, after receiving a message from the chiefs of the 
Delawares who are now settled near the mouth of the Wabash, informing us 
that a treaty was to be held at O’Post [Vincennes] by the English and 
Kickapoo Indians, and that they would attend to know the purport of the 
same, and if their brothers, the Long Knives would send a man they could 
rely on, they would, on their return, inform him of the same, as they were 
apprehensive the Kickapoos would strike their brothers, the Long Knives.  
Therefore, we thought it most prudent, and shall send immediately a certain 
James Harrod and Garret Pendergrass to converse with them on the same.56 
 
In an attempt to counter British inroads among the Kickapoos and Wabash tribes, Euro-
American colonists organized an Indian council at Fort Pitt only months later, in July 
1776.  The colonists hoped to win over Indian support, or at least persuade them to 
neutrality.  Kickapoos, among other nations, attended the conference.57  In exchange for 
gifts, the Kickapoos were happy to pledge an “alliance” of friendship as they had so often 
before with the French, Spanish, and British. 
Just as they misguided other Europeans, Kickapoos initially opted for a policy of 
pretended Euro-American allegiance during the Revolutionary War.  The competition 
between Britain and her colonists again provided the Kickapoos with desired gifts and 
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services, prompting the Kickapoos to switch their allegiance whenever profitable 
opportunities arose.  Agreeing to peace at Fort Pitt, many Kickapoos later joined a 
Niagara-bound British army of seven hundred, consisting of Canadians as well as 
Senecas, Mohawks, Chippewas, Ottawas, and Pottawattamies.58  In 1778, a few 
Kickapoos aided George Rogers Clark in his attack on Kaskaskia and Cahokia.59  
Clearly, the only nation the Kickapoos intended to support was their own, and early 
Kickapoo relations with the incipient United States are best defined by conflict.  During 
the American Revolutionary War, opportunistic Kickapoos raided settlements, thieving 
livestock, goods, and captives.  And just as before, they promised peace whenever 
attending Indian councils.60   
 By the end of the American Revolution, the newly independent Euro-Americans 
hoped to subjugate Indian nations, just as Britain had expected after the French and 
Indian War.  This time, however, European inroads penetrated the backcountry far deeper 
than before.  Kickapoos were no longer beyond the reach of colonists.  During the Euro-
American era of influence, Kickapoos impunity would diminish, and the tribe would 
suffer first hand from the advancing United States army.  Regardless of hopes inspired by 
the British posts remaining in the backcountry after the war, the tribes’ days of oscillating 
loyalties were brought to an end as British forces withdrew following the 1814 Treaty of 
Ghent.  The glory days of the Kickapoos’ diplomatic system drew to an inglorious end. 
——— 
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During the thirty years from the early days of the French and Indian War through 
the American Revolution, Kickapoos determined their own relations with European 
powers.  Kickapoos had decided when and how long peace would last, and usually their 
assurances of peace proved to be stop-gap measures between opportune raids and covert 
exploitation of imperial powers.  The “middle ground” may well have been a place of 
compromise and cooperation for many tribes, but to the Kickapoos it served more as a 
hunting ground, not of furs and hides but a place where European merchants and settlers 
could be raided with impunity.  Striking from deep in the backcountry, the Kickapoos did 
not fear unlikely.  But more importantly, the tribal diplomacy offered sufficient 
reconciliatory gestures and pledges of fidelity, generally dissuading Europeans from full 
scale attacks like those that haunted early French relations.  Competing European nations, 
desperate to control Native American populations, eagerly accepted empty assurances, 
repeatedly opening themselves up to Kickapoo exploitation.  Just like the European 
imperial powers who acted in their own self-interests, Kickapoos remained truly only 
loyal to themselves. 
 With the Purchase of Louisiana and the eventual expulsion of Britain, the United 
States effectively eliminated European competition in Kickapoo areas of interest.  Finally 
able to unilaterally manhandle tribes that were formerly “indulged,” the Euro-Americans 
rendered the Kickapoo diplomatic system ineffective.  A variety of cultural adaptations 
would follow, further diverging the three Kickapoo bands.  But from 1750 to 1780, as 
one historian put it, the Kickapoos were truly the “lords of the middle border.”61 
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The Collapse of Colonial Kickapoo Foreign Policy, 1790-1830 
 
During the early and late colonial periods, Kickapoos developed a distinct 
political and diplomatic strategy.  From the first arrival of Europeans southwest of the 
Great Lakes until the French and Indian War, France steadily extended its influence 
westward.  Jesuit missionaries and wealth-seeking traders penetrated the backcountry 
hoping to convert Indians to Christianity and to profit from the fur trade.  Tribes 
responded to the intrusions in varied ways, but Kickapoos were among the last to align 
themselves with foreigners.  Finally accepting the inevitability of European intrusion, 
Kickapoos found themselves in a position to profit when Britain engaged France, both 
vying for territorial dominance and access to the lucrative Indian trade.  European 
rivalries reinvigorated the struggling Kickapoo nation as the tribe pledged their loyalty to 
whoever offered gifts, trade and services.  From the French and Indian War to the 
American Revolutionary War, the tribe retained its sovereignty longer than other Indian 
nations by mastering the concept of neutrality and shifting alliances towards Europeans 
while asserting territorial dominance over marginal tribes in the Illinois Country.  But 
American independence initiated unique political and territorial changes after two 
centuries of European rivalries that gradually undermined Kickapoo independence. 
As the United States organized itself and pushed west, the tribe faced new 
challenges that caused Kickapoo diplomacy to collapse.  Increasing Euro-American 
settlers, United States military conflicts subjugating Indians and expelling European 
influences, and Indian treaties forcing land cessations and terminating tribal diplomatic 
relationships with other nations, effectively ending long-practiced Kickapoo diplomacy.  
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The rise of United States territorial dominance in the backcountry overwhelmed the 
Kickapoos and rendered useless their former foreign policies.   
Fighting for independence in the Revolutionary War, Euro-Americans competed 
with Britain for backcountry posts and Indian alliances.  Britain hoped to retain the forts 
both as profitable fur trade posts and as diplomatic centers whereby Indians might be 
convinced to blockade, raid, and destabilize expanding Euro-Americans.  Even after the 
war’s conclusion the British were slow to relinquish these posts. 
 The Revolutionary War was a time of intense conflict and competition in the 
backcountry.  Representing the rebellious colonists, George Rogers Clark swept through 
Vincennes, Cahokia and Kaskaskia winning Indian loyalties with military success and 
overt intimidation.1  The war effort gradually turned to the east, soldiers withdrew, and 
Euro-American officials lacked the funds to bribe backcountry Indians.  One such official 
complained,  
I wish you’d tell me how Mr. Machieval advises to keep up the Indian 
Interests with out Goods, either to give or sell.  The fear of Col. Clark & 
his 500 men has hitherto terrified them but … will not they shortly find out 
that he has not 200?  I ought to have blankets & Stroudings for them 
before winter if possible.  Mr. Lindsay’s commission, if he succeeds, will 
not purchase half enough for the Indian nations bordering upon us.  I wish 
some Gentleman of business would undertake the matter with further 
powers.2 
 
Taking advantage of declining Euro-American influence, Major Arent de Peyster from a 
Canadian base pursued British designs in the backcountry, mingling with Indians and 
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securing promises of a unified resistance to Euro-American expansion.  Meeting privately 
with the Kickapoos and Piankishaws, and later with the Mascoutins, Ouiattanong, Miamis 
and Peorias as well, Peyster convinced the Indians of their own self-interest to seal off the 
Wabash and Ohio Rivers from expanding Euro-Americans.  He instructed the Wabash 
tribes to “shut up the Wabash on the approach of an enemy and that some of our people 
should go to reconnoiter towards the fall of the Ohio [River].3  And though not directly 
involved in the War, Spain also intensified Indian meetings to ensure the tribes resisted 
any British or Euro-American encroachment into the region then serving as a buffer to the 
Southwest.  St. Louis Commandant Francisco Cruzat bribed Kickapoos with wampum 
belts, tobacco, and other goods.  He admonished the tribe to abstain from an alliance with 
either the British or Euro-Americans, and even encouraged an attack on a British fort to 
dispel any non-Spanish foreigners.4   
In 1781 the war was coming to an end as revolutionary forces surrounded Lord 
Cornwallis, and the new nation immediately looked west.  In October, 1781, Cornwallis 
was defeated and the Revolutionary War was all but over.  In the fall of 1781 a Euro-
American official met with the Kickapoos.  He promised them peace and trade as long as 
they delivered up the wampum belt the English had given them along with an “assurance 
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of their future fidelity.”5  As they had before, Kickapoos offered friendship to the new 
would-be backcountry power.  But within a year Kickapoos were pressing their new 
friends for more and more gifts.  In February 1782, after prolonged pressure, one Euro-
American official capitulated, giving the Kickapoos six bushels of corn, fifty pounds of 
bread, four pounds of gun powder, ten pounds of ball, and one gallon of tafia rum in 
exchange for unspecified services.6  Again in 1783 agents of the new nation visited the 
Kickapoos and other western tribes, hoping to strengthen their relationships and surely 
bringing gifts.7   Although the war ended, Kickapoos concurrently extracted gifts from all 
the parties—the British, Spanish, French traders, and Euro-Americans. 
 
DISPOSSESSION BY LEGISLATION AND ENCROACHMENT 
 In 1778 a U.S. topographical research expedition examined the Wabash River, 
particularly noting its adequacy for settlement.  The engineers reported that the Wabash 
was “a beautiful River, with high and upright banks.”  It was “less subject to overflow, 
than any other river (the Ohio excepted) in this part of America.”  They boasted the 
river’s nearly year long navigatable nature, and noted it was a gentle river unobstructed 
by falls.  More importantly, they reported that the land bordering the river was 
“remarkably fertile, and several parts of it are natural meadows.”  Covered with “fine 
long grass,” these meadows were only overshadowed by the variety of plentiful and high 
timber.  But for those whom fertile farm lands and ample lumber was not sufficient, the 
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report also identified a silver mine and speculated that others awaited discovery nearby.  
Additionally, the Wabash “abounds with Salt Springs, and any quantity of salt may be 
made from them,” and “the hills are replenished with the best coal, and there is plenty of 
lime and free stone, blue, yellow and white clay, for glass works and pottery.”  Many 
delicious European fruits could be found as well: apples, peaches, cherries, currants, 
gooseberries, and melons.  A good strain of hemp grew wild, as did a variety of grapes 
that were ideal for a “well-tasted Red Wine.”  But wine was not the only alcohol easy to 
produce along the Wabash, because the report explained that good large hops grew wild 
as well, and the region was “particularly adapted to the culture of rice.”  Less anyone fear 
entering a wild untamed land, the report also reminded readers that there were two nearby 
posts, Vincennes and Ouistanon, where corn, wheat and tobacco were produced.  These 
villages also enjoyed large herds of horses, stocks of swine, and plenty of cattle.  Indeed, 
the region appeared to have all the supplies any settler, miner, or other European might 
need in order to thrive in the paradisiacal Wabash River Valley.8   
 The one item missing from the report was the Native American inhabitants—but 
in the eyes of most Europeans those inhabitants did not count.  At that time approximately 
4,000 Indians (including several hundred Kickapoos) lived between Lake Michigan and 
the Mississippi River.  Another 1,000 Kickapoos, Piankashaws, Musquitons, and 
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Quiatonons lived immediately south of Lake Superior.9  A 1778 report counted 800 
Kickapoos, Piankashaws, Mascoutins and Vermillions just around Fort Pitt (present-day 
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania).10  Despite these expansive populations, Europeans continued 
to press westward “settling” the Ohio Country. 
 Among other tools, Euro-Americans disposed the Ohio Country Indians through 
legislation and encroachment.  The 1783 Treaty of Paris served to conclude the 
Revolutionary War, but it also carved up western lands without consideration of Indians.  
The United States of America claimed all lands east of the Mississippi and below the 
middle of Lake Superior.  To raise revenues, the new nation immediately prepared the 
region for sale to already anxious settlers.  Facilitating such endeavors, New York ceded 
its western claims (from Lake Erie to the Ohio River) in 1782.11  In 1784 Virginia ceded 
its western lands to Congress.12  In return, Congress created the Virginia Military district 
in present-day Ohio, providing Virginia her own lands to repay veterans.  Payments 
varied from lots of 100 acres to 17,500 acres, depending on rank.13  Also in 1784, the 
United States hosted the second Treaty of Fort Stanwix.  At the first treaty in 1768 the 
Iroquois surrendered the lands south of the Ohio River (present day Kentucky), though it 
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was really never theirs to give.  At the second treaty, the United States reaffirmed those 
cessations, once more agreed to by the Iroquois who still had no significant presence in 
the region.  The following year the United States met with Wyandots, Delawares, 
Chippewas and Ottawas representatives at Fort McIntosh likewise to obtain their title to 
the lands surrendered by the Iroquois.  The Treaty of Fort McIntosh “legalized” Euro-
American settlement south of the Ohio and north of it as far as the Muskingum River, 
which begins about a hundred miles south of present-day Cleveland and meanders south 
to present-day Marietta where it feeds into the Ohio River.  Also in 1785, Congress 
passed the infamous Land Ordinance, which established the principles by which the 
nation would divide up and settle western lands.  The bill called for systematic surveys of 
the West to facilitate its lands division into six-square-mile townships of 36 640-acre lots.  
In 1787 Congress passed the Northwest ordinance.  This legislation organized the 
Northwest Territory and set the precedent for absorbing western lands as new states.  
Famous for their long term implications, these two ordinances offered a presumptuous 
declaration of the United States’ intent to incorporate the West.  These treaties and 
congressional decrees primarily carved up lands immediately east of the Kickapoos.  
Nevertheless, the legislation validated and stimulated Euro-American migrations down 
the Ohio and closer to the Kickapoos’ Wabash homelands.   
 Under pressure from expanding Euro-Americans, many Indians looked to the 
British, still entreating Natives from their illegal backcountry posts.  On several occasions 
British representatives met with angry Indians: Chippewas, Delawares, Kickapoos, 
Miamis, Ottawas, Shawnees, Wyandots, and others.  Meeting at Fort Detroit, the British 
helped organize many such tribes into a unified unit.  This Wabash confederacy had a 
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fluid membership which at various times consisted of bands from different tribes, 
including: Wyandots, Shawnees, Pottawattamies, Ottawas, Ojibwas, Delawares, Miamis, 
Iroquois, Kickapoos, Mascoutins and Kaskaskias.  Again in 1786 many of these tribes 
gathered at a Wyandot village where they pledged to uphold the Ohio River as a final 
boundary against the encroaching Euro-Americans.  When the United States invited 
northwestern tribes to council in 1785, few Indians participated.14  When the United 
States hosted another treaty at the mouth of the Miami River the following year, 
attendance remained low.  Kickapoos and other Wabash tribes were among those that 
refused to attend.15  For the time, they chose to unify with Britain against the encroaching 
Euro-Americans.  Indeed, when a band of Chickasaw Indians complained to Spanish 
authorities about Kickapoo raids, the Spanish admitted they held little sway over the 
marauders, but rather that the British were the tribe’s strongest allies.16  Again in 1786 
Indians met at Detroit, complaining to the British about the expanding Euro-Americans.  
One chief explained, “the Americans have given us great trouble since the peace 
concluded between you and them, in which we, the Indians were left out.”  The Indians 
resolved to send a letter to the Congress inviting that assembly to travel out to the Ohio 
hinterlands to directly discuss a definitive boundary between Indians and Euro-American 
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settlers.  The Indians insisted that they wished for “a lasting peace between them and 
us.”17 
 The Indians never got their chance to meet with Congress, and peaceful 
negotiations quickly deteriorated into settler encroachment and Indian raids.  In the 
summer of 1785 a mixed group of Shawnees, Miamis, Cherokees and Kickapoos scalped 
and killed some Euro-American adventurers traveling down the Ohio.18  The following 
summer George Rogers Clark received word that there were hostile Indians around 
Vincennes.19  George Croghan explained that Indians neighboring Vincennes, among the 
first to accept United States authority, were growing apprehensive about counseling with 
the Euro-Americans.  Another letter to Clark from a schoolmaster and speculator named 
John Filson also revealed new attitudes at Vincennes, explaining “this place…that once 
trembled at your victories arms…is now entirely anarchical and we shudder at the daily 
expectation of horrid murders.”  Filson felt abandoned, noting Virginia had withdrawn its 
garrisons when it ceded the region to Congress.  But more so, he blamed the changing 
attitudes on “British intrigue, lack of organized government, and land hunger.”20  The 
backcountry inhabitants were turning against the Euro-Americans. 
 Congress resolved to nip this upheaval in the bud.  In 1786 it called for the 
mobilization of a small army.  Secretary of War Henry Knox explained that the troops’ 
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purpose was peacekeeping, their presence intended to combat “warm hostilities” from the 
Wabash tribes with simple intimidation.  Two companies were stationed on the Miami, 
one at the confluence of the Tuscarawas and the Muskingum, four at the mouth of the 
Muskingum at the Ohio, from which they could support troops stationed nearby at Fort 
McIntosh and Fort Pitt.21  The troops were in position by late summer and by October 
they were marching toward the Wabash.22 
 As Euro-American troops advanced, tensions elevated in the backcountry.  Many 
Indians turned to the British for support.  Among the first, two Kickapoos reported to 
Detroit with intelligence regarding the armies advancing on the Wabash from different 
routes.  The British officials offered their condolences, but little more.23   
The crisis was heightened when an upstart party of Euro-Americans seized 
Vincennes in 1786, claiming they were acting in the interests of the United States.24  
Knox was particularly concerned with the occurrence at Vincennes.  He viewed the 
seizure of the town as a threat to the sovereignty of the United States.25  In July of 1787 
the captors of Vincennes sent a petition to Congress, requesting formal recognition of 
their ownership of the surrounding lands, amounting to thirty square miles.  They claimed 
the land was given them by Virginia and that the Indians had surrendered the land at that 
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time.  With the withdrawal of Virginia and its cessation of land to Congress, the capturers 
feared they would loose their claim.  Most of all, they intended to earn federal recognition 
of their property before any conflict broke out, and they wanted the U.S. Army to help 
defend their lands if such should occur.26   
 The incident at Vincennes is a prime example of the audacious encroachment of 
Euro-Americans onto Indian lands.  Knox observed that the Indians quickly learned that 
“some of the whites, on the frontiers, are not so impressed of the propriety of justice, and 
moderation, as to be governed thereby, in their conduct towards the Indians.”27  Indeed, 
the land-hungry Euro-Americans pressed forward into Indian-occupied territories, and 
they did not hesitate to violate laws if there was no body to enforce them.  One 
congressional committee concluded,  
lawless persons attack the Indians with impunity—but there is, at present, 
no system of civil law established in the territory of the United States 
north west of the River Ohio, whereby the conduct of individuals can be 
controlled, or the offences of Crimes prevented or punished therein.28 
 
The committee’s remedy was remarkably simple, and equally ineffective.  Much like 
King George’s 1763 solution to a similar problem, the congressional committee resolved 
to prohibit all civilian and military Euro-Americans from entering the region without a 
permit.  This stop-gap measure was short lived, but it seemed the major war was averted.  
But once the military withdrew, Congress essentially removed any iota of governance it 
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had in the region.  Congress turned administration over to states and those adjacent to the 
recently organized Northwest Territory took on the tasks of monitoring wrongful 
settlement of Indian lands, further removing any federal constraints.29  Nothing beyond 
weak and passive state governments remained to stop the advancing hordes of Euro-
American settlers. 
 Three months after the former resolution, Congress reversed its decision and 
presented a new idea to administer the Ohio Country.  By the authority of its military 
might and the Treaty of Paris, Congress resolved to allow settlement in the region north 
of the Ohio River in October, 1787.  The newly available lands reached all the way out to 
the Wabash and then down to the Ohio.  Though only one more advance in the relentless 
conquest of the west, for the first time the Kickapoos were directly affected as their 
eastern territory was then open to Euro-American settlement.30  Arthur St. Clair was 
appointed governor of the new Northwest Territory (composed of present-day Ohio, 
Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Wisconsin, and eastern Minnesota), and directed to 
“extinguish the Indian rights to the westward as far as the River Mississippi.”  His one 
bargaining chip with the Indians was to allow them to punish Euro-Americans “in such 
manner as the Indians shall think proper” should they cross whatever new lines St. Clair 
negotiated.  That did little to benefit the Indians living east of the Wabash who preferred 
to stay in their own lands unmolested.  Last, St. Clair was to identify the most powerful 
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men in the tribes and then apply any means necessary to endear them to the United States 
in order to ease future dispossession.31 
 The first United States census, performed in 1790, reveals intense early settlement 
in the West.  The four most western counties of Pennsylvania (Westmoreland, Allegheny, 
Washington, and Feyette) totaled 63,518 Euro-Americans.  Kentucky boasted 73,677.  
Two major settlements developed in the Virginia military district: Massie’s Station 
(present-day Manchester, Ohio) was founded in 1791; Chillicothe was founded in 1796, 
hosted a constitutional convention in 1803, and became the capital of Ohio when the state 
was organized in 1803.32  
 
DISPOSSESSION BY CONFLICT 
 The post-Revolutionary War era was not one of peace.  The United States needed 
to generate revenue, and land hungry citizens uncontrollably coveted western lands.  
These two problems pointed to one simple answer—military conquest and settlement of 
Indian lands.  The Kickapoos previously prospered from European competition and war, 
but for the first time the tribe itself was the target of a unified large scale massive 
campaign to not only subjugate the Indians but to confiscate their lands. 
 Following the 1783 Treaty of Paris, encroaching settlers increasingly came into 
conflict with backcountry Indians.  Minor Indian raids typified their relationship as 
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settlers overran present-day Kentucky and then suffered attacks from tribes that retreated 
across the Ohio River.  In May of 1787 an officer on the frontier, Colonel Josiah Harmar, 
reported that the Wabash tribes were raiding Kentucky and “plundering the inhabitants of 
their horses, and occasionally murdering them.”  Harmar requested a new fort and 
garrison to be erected on the high end of the Wabash in order to “keep the Indians in awe, 
and, in great measure, secure the frontier inhabitants.”33   
In the following month Secretary of War Henry Knox made a similar request, 
suggesting new forts at the Miami and Cayahoga villages southwest of Lake Erie along 
with the dispatch of 1500 troops to the region.  Examining the conflict between Indians 
and Euro-American settlers, Knox concluded, “either one or the other party must remove 
to a great distance, or government must keep them both in awe by a strong hand.”  Knox 
even suggested a long chain of forts from Fort Pitt to the Wabash and down to the Ohio, 
creating a military barrier between the Indians and Euro-American settlers.34  Congress 
demanded a treaty with the Wabash tribes and ultimately ordered troops dispatched to 
discourage Indian hostilities.  Congress instructed the U.S. Army to join up with the 
Kentucky militia and then only to attack if Indians could not be induced peacefully to 
tolerate the theft of their lands.35   
 United States representatives found few Indians willing to evict themselves; 
instead, the Natives grew angry at the expansion of Euro-Americans.  Governor St. Clair 
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observed, “Our settlements are extending themselves so fast on every quarter where they 
can be extended.”  But to the Indians, he concluded, “The idea of being ultimately obliged 
to abandon their country rankles in their minds.”36   
Hoping to appease the Ohio Country tribes, Knox requested Congress to 
appropriate $40,000 to purchase lands.  Congress began dolling out funds for such 
treaties, but the plan was frustrated by conflicting land claims and the Indians’ refusal to 
sell.37  Many tribes simply boycotted the United States’ treaty councils.  One such 
meeting was held at Detroit in 1788, but the Kickapoos refused to attend.38  The tribe 
ignored another treaty attempt later that year.39  The Euro-American’s even employed the 
Wyandots to mediate peace with the Kickapoos, but the tribe refused.40  Instead, 
Kickapoos continued to raid across the Ohio.  Governor St. Clair concluded, “a war with 
the Western tribes, at least, seems inevitable….  A war with them will probably involve 
some others, and it will soon become general.”41  
In early spring of 1788 Euro-American concerns were validated when a party of 
Kickapoos captured William Biggs, a merchant carrying beaver pelts to Cahokia.  The 
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Indians asked his nationality.  “French?  English?  Long Knife?”  When Biggs answered 
in the affirmative to the latter, his inquisitor grew angry and offered up the only English 
words the merchant would hear during his captivity—“Son of a bitch!”  Certainly over 
the past five years the Wabash Kickapoos developed great hostility towards Euro-
Americans.  After some debate on whether or not to kill their captive, Kickapoos took 
Biggs to a nearby village and explained that his life would replace that of an Indian whom 
the Long Knives had killed.  During the next two weeks Biggs convinced his captors that 
he had no valuable skills (claiming he was a writer) and would be little more than a drain 
on their resources, at which point they agreed to sell him to a Frenchman at a nearby 
post.42   
Trans-Ohio raiding was spiraling out of control as frequent reports flooded the 
desks of military post commanders and Governor St. Clair.43  The military outposts at 
Vincennes and Fort Harmar struggled to protect their own supplies, let alone ever 
encroaching settlers.44  In a formal petition the Kentuckians complained that Wabash 
Indians “kill our people, steal our horses and at times have killed and drove off numbers 
of our horned cattle.”  The plea continued, “neither can we cultivate our land but with a 
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guard of our inhabitants equipt with arms.”45  Joined by other Wabash tribes, the 
Kickapoos mounted ever-growing bands of disgruntled and aggressive warriors.  Western 
settlements regularly appealed for support from their recently estranged Virginia 
government.46  Many Kentuckians organized their own raids, likewise crossing the Ohio 
and attacking Indian settlements.  In a request for additional soldiers to guard the border, 
St. Clair wrote to President George Washington with a full explanation: 
It is not to be expected, sir, that the Kentucky people will or can submit 
patiently to the cruelties and depredations of those savages; they are in the 
habit of retaliation, perhaps, without attending precisely to the nation from 
which the injuries are received…. they also will march through that 
country to redress themselves, and the government will be laid prostrate.47   
 
Murders and plundering occurred on both sides of the Ohio at the hands of Indians and 
Euro-Americans.  Knox observed, “The injuries and murders have been so reciprocal, that 
it would be a point of critical investigation to know on which side they have been the 
greatest.”48   
 In addition to settler encroachment and violent Indian reciprocity, British 
influence contributed to the hostilities in the backcountry.  The British met regularly with 
many of the Ohio Country tribes, pledging support and encouraging the Indians to restrain 
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advancing settlers through violent tactics.49  The United States attempted to limit British 
influence by reaffirming trade restrictions, stating only U.S. citizens could trade with the 
Indians.  Their empty declarations had little impact.50  Increasingly it seemed only one 
solution remained—war.  
 Since 1788 leading U.S. officials perceived war as inevitable.   Governor St. Clair, 
Secretary of War Henry Knox, and President Washington all supported war.51  In a final 
attempt at peace, Governor St. Clair gathered representatives from the Wyandots, 
Delawares, Ottawas, Chippewas, Pottawattamies, and Sauk for a treaty at Fort Harmar in 
January, 1789.  Threatening a massive campaign, St. Clair forced the Indians to agree to 
the former cessations granted in the illegitimate treaties of Fort Stanwix and McIntosh.  
As before, the Kickapoos refused to attend, and the treaty did little to stop the violence.  
By the winter of 1789 Congress empowered Washington to call forth state militias for a 
war in the West, and by June 1790 troops were mobilized.52   
 The ensuing war lasted from 1790 to 1794.  The first major battle occurred in 
October of 1790, wherein Miami Chief Little Turtle led a confederacy of tribes against 
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General Harmar in a mutually costly stalemate, resulting in the temporary retreat of U.S. 
forces.53  Among many tribes, the Kickapoos participated and suffered injuries and 
fatalities.  Harmar recorded that the tribe’s losses were comparable to the other major 
contributing nations—the Shawnee, Delawares, Cherokees and Pottawattamies.54  
Regardless, the retreat of Harmar’s troops strengthened the Indian confederacy, and by 
December Indian raids resumed.  This also reaffirmed the United States’ intentions to 
regroup and invade the region in the following year.55  In the interim, the Euro-Americans 
responded by offering rewards for Indian, British, or French scalps, revealing open 
hostility towards both the Natives and Europeans inciting the conflicts.56  Then in March, 
1791, the U.S. sent one last warning to the tribes.  Circulating a speech that threatened 
“such a number of warriors as would drive you entirely out of the country,” the U.S. 
demanded the Indians peacefully accept encroaching settlers and consequent land theft.57 
 In May of 1791 another United States army marched along the Ohio.58  This 
second attempt was led by Arthur St. Clair; meanwhile the Kentucky militia, organized 
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under Brigadier-general Winfield Scott and Colonel James Wilkinson, launched precision 
strikes against the Wabash tribes.  Fearful that Euro-Americans might take advantage of 
the high winter waters to sail up the Wabash, Kickapoos evacuated their winter sites early 
and moved further west by April.  Nevertheless, in July Scott’s militia caught up with the 
Kickapoos, killing thirty-two Indians and taking some fifty prisoners.59  Again in August 
Wilkinson’s militia burned down several Wabash villages, killing ten and capturing 
thirty.60  In November, Little Turtle led allied tribes to repulse the US army under Arthur 
St. Clair, and the U.S. forces again retreated.  Nevertheless, Wabash Kickapoos were 
utterly routed by the militia; their villages burned; their crops destroyed.  Wilkinson 
reported, “The enemy was unable to make the smallest resistance.”61 
 For the first time since their 1715 climactic defeat at the hands of the French, the 
Kickapoos felt the full ramifications of a European nation’s wrath.  The tribe’s 1715 
defeat had forged a dramatic shift in Kickapoo policy and their relationship with the 
dominant foreign power.  Suffering a comparable loss to the U.S. surely spawned similar 
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questions and led Kickapoos to rethink their position of hostile resistance once more.  
Though no uniform policy transformation immediately rose from the ashes of these 1791 
disasters, Kickapoos certainly must have questioned their methods of diplomacy. 
 The following year passed more peacefully as the Euro-Americans, British, 
Kickapoos and other tribes all maneuvered for better strategic and diplomatic positions.  
In January, U.S. soldiers at Vincennes observed that the Kickapoos shared their “great 
intention of making a solid peace with the United States.”62  Meanwhile other Kickapoos 
pledged their support to Blue Jacket and Little Turtle who remained unwilling to yield to 
U.S. expansion.63  In April some Kickapoos continued their raids against the Osages, 
while turning down a Sauk invitation to raid Americans.64  Backcountry tribes met with 
British agents as well, who observed a general discontentment with all Europeans.65  
Unyielding, St. Clair distributed a speech among the tribes yet again, admonishing them 
to tolerate peacefully dispossession by settlers.66   
 The United States spent 1792 entreating the Wabash tribes.  Brigadier-General 
Rufus Putnam organized a U.S. council in June.67  Many Kickapoos, anxious to avoid 
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another severe routing, agreed to peace and even accepted U.S. demands to build a fort 
near present-day Peoria.68  In a letter to General Knox, Putnam explained his intent to win 
over the Wabash tribes with gifts and annuities, hopefully isolating the Miami-Shawnee 
confederacy from their Wabash allies.69  In exchange for their fidelity, Knox authorized 
Putnam to guarantee the Kickapoos’ lands against encroaching Euro-Americans.70  In 
September, 1792, Putnam signed a treaty with the Kickapoos and other western tribes in 
which both pledged peace, and the United States promised to remain south of the Ohio.71   
 The year of 1793 was a prosperous one for the Kickapoos.  They regularly 
received gifts at Fort Vincennes and enjoyed trade goods from Euro-American traders.  
An officer posted there commented, “They have been supplied with goods on their own 
terms by reason of a number of traders having, on the news of the peace, flocked hither 
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with considerable stores.”  He explained that “the presents made them by the Untied 
States” placed them in a “comfortable condition.”72  Officers all over the West likewise 
noted the complacent status of Indians following the peace treaty.73  It seemed a win-win 
situation.   
 Making the year additionally prosperous, Kickapoos also enjoyed gifts from the 
Spanish.  Ever concerned about maintaining a buffer against other European peoples, 
Spain continued to send gifts to the Kickapoos in hopes of checking U.S. gestures.  By 
January 1794 U.S. officials began to worry “that the minds of the Indians was much 
poisoned” by gifts of tobacco and wampum belts.74  Additionally, Kickapoos received 
invitations from the Miamis to rejoin the confederacy, threatening the U.S. strategy of 
divide and conquer.  As usual, when confronted by U.S. officials, Kickapoos declared 
they “would forever be faithful.”75 
 In October of 1793 the United States Great Lakes legion marched out under the 
command of “Mad” Anthony Wayne.76  Engaging Indians on October 16th, the U.S. 
soldiers drove back the Natives.   During the winter Wayne began constructing forts, and 
by March 1794 his forces erected Fort Recovery on the site of St. Clair’s earlier defeat.  
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On the last day of June, the confederacy attacked the fort.  Finding the army well 
defended, Little Turtle ordered the retreat on the first of July.  This incident cost the 
Miami chief a degree of prestige; and the Shawnee chief Blue Jacket seized leadership of 
the confederacy, leading them into the Battle of Fallen Timbers on August 20, 1794.  In 
this major battle between the U.S. army and the Miami Confederacy, the Indians were 
utterly defeated.  Retreating to the gates of the British Fort Miami, Indians found no 
support.  The gates were pulled shut and the Indians left to hopelessly defend themselves 
against the advancing U.S. army.  Overwhelmed, the Indians were thrashed and the 
confederacy shattered.77  And though the Kickapoos did not participate in the battle, their 
fate was equally determined by its outcome. 
 
LOSS OF TERRITORIAL AND POLITICAL SOVIEGNTY 
 After losing the Battle of Fallen Timbers, the Ohio Indians were forced to agree to 
the Treaty of Greenville the following year.  That treaty required Indians to cede most of 
the Ohio Country in exchange for annuities.  It also specified the United States as the only 
nation with whom the Indians could interact.  Last, the treaty demanded ten Indian chiefs 
remain hostage to the U.S. until all captured soldiers were released.  Over fifteen tribes 
signed the treaty.  Of the eighty-five signatories, Kickapoos accounted for three.78  
Though the U.S. had organized the Northwest Territory in 1787, it was not until the 
Treaty of Greenville that Euro-Americans could semi-safely settle the Ohio River Valley. 
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 Three months later a second treaty was signed that had a major impact on the 
Kickapoos.  In November of 1795 the United States and Great Britain signed Jay’s 
Treaty.  Generally remembered as a negotiation over navigation and commerce, the treaty 
also had a provision for the withdrawal of British forces and traders from the Ohio 
Country.  It prescribed, “His Majesty will withdraw all his troops and garrisons from all 
posts and places within the boundary lines assigned by the treaty of peace to the United 
States.”  Not only did the treaty allow the U.S. to expand, but it stripped the Ohio Country 
Indians of convenient contact with a potential ally—Great Britain.   
 The defeat of the Indian confederacy and consequent treaties had harsh territorial 
and cultural consequences.  Indian community order spiraled out of control.  Youthful 
warriors, angered by perceived failures of their leaders, plunged Native villages into 
chaos.  One historian has observed,  
The chiefs who tried to manage this rapidly changing world of first 
neglectful and  then demanding fathers failed in their attempts.  They failed 
most obviously in the Ohio Valley and the southern Great Lakes country…. 
They failed as mediators; they failed to hold support among their own 
people; they failed to preserve peace in their own towns.  Many of them fell 
as victims of their own relatives and warriors.  The final crisis of the 
political middle ground was marked by the blood of chiefs.79   
 
As the influence of traditional leaders was replaced by riotous youth, Indian communities 
struggled to maintain their cultural stability.  One Indian recounted, “When our sensible 
chiefs were alive… our young men were better and more obedient—but when our wise 
chiefs died—the wisdom of the nation died with them.”80  It was in the wake of this 
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cultural turmoil that various revitalization efforts originated, such as the Handsome Lake 
movement and the followers of Tenskwatawa (the Shawnee Prophet). 
 Over the following years the United States reaffirmed its territorial claims over the 
disjointed Indian tribes.  In 1800 Congress organized Indiana Territory, essentially 
replacing the Northwest Territory lands except the region that became the state of Ohio 
three years later.  In 1803 the U.S. gathered Kickapoos and other tribes to sign the Treaty 
of Fort Wayne.  The treaty reaffirmed the Treaty of Greenville, particularly focusing on 
the cessations of lands, and demanded that the tribes relocate to the region between 
Vincennes, Kaskaskia and Clarksville.  The treaty also set the precedent of forced land 
exchanges and migrations—a new concept for Kickapoos.  Also in 1803, the United 
States secured Louisiana, purchasing French claims over the region and more importantly 
removing French and Spanish influences and support from the Indians’ diplomatic 
playbook.  The following year the U.S. forced a treaty on the Sauks and Foxes and 
another upon the Delawares and Piankashaws, confiscating Indian land for Euro-
American settlement.  In 1805 the Treaty of Grouseland made Delawares, Otawatomis, 
Miamis, Eel River and Weas surrender lands.  In that same year, the Piankashaws were 
also forced to cede lands constituting the southwest corner of present-day Illinois.81  In 
1809 Congress organized Illinois Territory, including present-day Illinois and Wisconsin, 
from lands confiscated from Ohio Country Indians.  Also in 1809, William Henry 
Harrison forced the Kickapoos into a treaty reaffirming the Fort Wayne agreements and 
ceding the Wabash and Vermillion River Valleys.  Having lost their Spanish support, and 
vicariously and directly experienced territorially thieving U.S. treaties, the Kickapoos 
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observed the gradual subjugation of Natives in the Old Northwest.  Indeed, Harrison saw 
all of the recent treaties as the end of an era.  In a letter to the Secretary of War, Harrison 
penned,  
The happiness they enjoyed from their intercourse with the French is their 
perpetual theme—it is their golden age.  Those who are old enough to 
remember it,  speak of it with rapture and the young ones are taught to 
venerate it as the Ancients did the reign of Saturn ‘you cal us’ said an old 
Indian chief to me ‘your children why do you not make us happy as our 
fathers the French did?  They never took from us our lands, indeed they 
were in common with us – they planted where they pleased and they cut 
wood were they pleased and so did we – but now if a poor Indian attempts 
to take a little bark from a tree to cover him from the rain, up comes a 
white man and threatens to shoot him, claiming the tree is as his own.’82 
 
Native Americans throughout the backcountry were losing territorial control of their 
homelands, and the Kickapoos were no exception.  Over the next few years Euro-
Americans migrated into Illinois, encroaching on the once sovereign Kickapoos 
homelands.  Skirmishes arose, but the Kickapoos next great opportunity surfaced when 
the United States engaged Britain in the War of 1812. 
Hoping to delay the advance of Euro-American settlement, many Indians in the 
Indiana Territory found a new opportunity in the War of 1812.  As the rumblings of war 
grew obvious, one Kickapoo chief and eleven warriors approached an American officer to 
confess their loyalty.  That chief, Miche Pah-ka-en-na, stated that the Kickapoos were 
among the only Indians who were friendly with the United States.83  Nevertheless, as 
Tecumseh rallied Indians in the War of 1812, many Wabash and Vermillion Kickapoos 
joined the war effort, likewise siding with the British.  Still other Kickapoos on the 
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Wabash, Vermillion, and along the Mississippi chose to abstain from the conflict.  The 
Kickapoos were divided. 
 The War of 1812 was spawned of political differences between the United States 
and Great Britain, but in a war that ended in a stalemate between the two it was the 
Indians who paid the greatest cost.   In November 1811, William Henry Harrison led 
1,000 riflemen to Prophetstown, the capital city of Tecumseh and Tenskwatawa’s pan-
Indian movement.  The battle was costly for both sides but particularly destructive to the 
burgeoning Indian confederacy.  Tecumseh was killed the following year at the Battle of 
Thames, after which the confederacy shattered.  Not long after the United States and 
Great Britain reconciled in the 1814 Treaty of Ghent. 
 Though some Kickapoos were present at Prophetstown on the fateful day of 
Harrison’s attack, their numbers were few.   Some Kickapoos rallied to Tecumseh’s call 
to engage the United States; other Kickapoos migrated further east throughout Illinois and 
even down past St. Louis.  Much as during the French and Indian War and the 
Revolutionary War, Kickapoos preferred not to align themselves with any side until they 
knew just who would win.  Nevertheless, Kickapoos residing in present-day Illinois did 
take advantage of the militia and army’s preoccupation with Britain and plundered 
settlements with little fear of retribution.  Their activities were a central concern to 
Illinois Governor Ninian Edwards, who regularly complained of the Kickapoos in his 
journals and frequently attempted to negotiate peace with the tribe.84  In March of 1812, 
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Edwards ordered the mobilization of ranger companies to protect Illinois settlers who 
were still outnumbered by the region’s Indian inhabitants.85 
 Edwards’ fear of Indian raids was heightened by a suspicion of British efforts to 
encourage such attacks.  To counter suspected British influence and to minimize raids, 
Edwards organized an Indian council at Cahokia in April, 1812.  The meeting drew 
Pottawattamies, Kickapoos, Ottawas, and Chippewas who all listened to Edwards declare 
that the British and Tecumseh were liars.  He demanded peace by threatening war, 
warning of an army of 185,000 who would repay any raids against settlers.  Most of all, 
Edwards tried to convince the Indians of Britain’s disregard for the tribes.  In response, 
one Kickapoo chief promised peace.  A Pottawatomie chief also voiced the shared 
concern that elders could not control young warriors.  The Indians concluded by 
promising they would never join the British, stating, “Whatever the English do, you may 
rest assured that none of us will join them.”86  But Edwards never believed the Indians 
promises, not as long as the British were mingling among the tribes.87  Speaking to the 
Illinois assembly, the governor later declared his concern that the territory had “neither 
the means of conciliating nor any inducements to offer the Indians, sufficient to prevent 
over the double motives of hatred to us and partiality to our enemy.”88  Appealing to the 
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Secretary of War, Edwards concluded, “If the Illinois Indians become hostile, they will 
over-run this Territory.”89 
 Regardless of the council, Kickapoo warriors continued to raid in the Illinois.  
When Edwards demanded the tribe turn over those young men who murdered a Euro-
American family, tribal elders refused.90  By August 1812 Edwards received word that 
the Kickapoos had indeed “tendered their services to the British.”  He feared, “It is now 
well understood at Peoria that the Indians are for war, and are only waiting for direction 
from the British.”  On August 15th, 500 Kickapoos, Pottawattamies, Sauks and 
Winnebagos descended on Fort Dearborn near present-day Chicago, utterly routing Euro-
American soldiers retreating from the post for fear of advancing British.  In that same 
month, the Indians of the Illinois region attacked U.S. posts in four regions: some burned 
and destroyed Fort Dearborn; some raided Mississippi settlements; others joined Britain’s 
army under General William Hull east of Lake Michigan; and still others attacked small 
settlements near Peoria.  In all these endeavors, Kickapoos were well supplied with 
British powder.91 
 In October, Edwards called up 350 U.S. rangers and mounted volunteers to 
engage the Indians.  The army began in search of the most problematic tribe—the 
Kickapoos.  At the head of Lake Peoria, they fell upon a large village of Kickapoos and 
Miamis.  They quickly routed the village and pursued Natives into the swamps, 
eventually killing thirty, capturing four, seizing eighty horses, and burning the village and 
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crops to the ground.92  The following year the war turned against the British, and by 
October of 1813 the Battle of Thames crushed Indian hopes of expelling the Euro-
Americans.  The 1814 Treaty of Ghent formally ended the war between Great Britain and 
the United States, as the former definitively surrendered up all the territory south of the 
Great Lakes to the latter.  Kickapoos, and other Indians, lost any hope of any European 
ally against the encroaching United States.   
 With the British withdrawing and collapse of Tecumseh’s confederacy, the United 
States forced treaties upon the splintered tribes of the Old Northwest, including the 
Kickapoos.  In 1815 Kickapoos signed a treaty with William Clark ending their conflict 
with the U.S., pledging peace, promising to return any prisoners, and accepting all past 
treaties.  Again in 1816 the U.S. pressed Kickapoos and Weas into another treaty with 
analogous terms and reaffirming prior land cessions along the Wabash and Vermillion 
River.  In the same year, Sauks were forced into a similar treaty and Indiana received 
statehood.  In 1818 Peorias, Kaskaskias, Mitchigamis, Cahokias, and Tamorois 
surrendered their lands to the U.S. in a treaty signed at St. Marys, Ohio.93  With those 
tribes subjugated, Illinois received statehood in that same year.  
 In 1819 the Prairie and Vermillion/Wabash Kickapoos signed the harshest 
Kickapoo treaty to that date.  Meeting at Edwardsville, Illinois, the “Prairie Kickapoos” 
legislative subjugation was definitively spelled out.  On July 30th the Kickapoos agreed to 
surrender the Wabash Valley and all other lands east of the Mississippi River.  Their long 
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held lands were now turned over to the United States for Euro-American settlement.  In 
exchange, the U.S. promised less than ideal lands in Missouri in close proximity to the 
tribe’s traditional enemies, the Chickasaws and Osages.  Additionally, the Kickapoos 
received $3,000 in merchandise and consolidated former annuities into a new annual 
payment of $2,000 for fifteen years to be paid on the banks of the Osage River in 
Missouri.  But the treaty did not simply dispossess Indian lands; it also politically isolated 
the tribe.  Article three reads, “The said tribe acknowledge themselves now to be, and 
promise to continue, under the protection of the United States of America, and of no other 
nation, power, or sovereign, whatever.”  Article nine continues this idea, explaining: 
The United States will take the said Kickapoo tribe under their care and 
patronage, and will afford them protection against all persons whatever, 
provided they conform to the laws of the United States, and refrain from 
making war, or giving any insult or offence to any other Indian tribe, or to 
any foreign nation, without first having obtained that approbation and 
consent of the United States.94 
 
In this July 1819 treaty, the United States’ relationship to the Kickapoos changed from 
that of a fellow or competing nation to that of conqueror and “protector.”  The physical 
and political isolation from British forces in Canada left Kickapoos unable to rely on their 
play-off diplomacy, and the Edwardsville treaty made it a legal reality.  There was no 
other European power to turn to.  The Kickapoos were alone. 
 A second treaty in 1819 signed by the “Kickapoos of the Vermillion” made 
similar concessions.  Articles one and two ceded the Wabash River and all of present-day 
Illinois; Article three articulated annuities; article four explained payment would occur at 
the new undefined homeland; and article five reaffirmed the binding nature of the treaty.  
The following year both treaties were amended and the Vermillion/Wabash Kickapoos 
                                                 
94 Charles J. Kappler, Indian Treaties, p. 182-183.  
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were assigned to the region west of Kaskaskia, across the Mississippi River, along with 
the Prairie Kickapoos. 
 Over the next few years, the Kickapoo world drastically changed.  Many 
Kickapoos moved west to Missouri, yet others remained scattered in their homelands 
across Illinois and Indiana.  In 1822 the Sauk and Foxes signed a treaty surrendering 
lands to the United States; in 1825 the Sioux, Chippewas, Sacs, Foxes, Menominees, 
Iowas, Winnebagoes, Ottawas, and Pottawattamies agreed to U.S. territorial treaties.95   In 
1829 President Andrew Jackson offered his first inaugural address, explaining the 
debilitating cost to tribes that remained east of the Mississippi: 
By persuasion and force they have been made to retire from river to river 
and from mountain to mountain, until some of the tribes have become 
extinct and others have left but remnants to preserve for awhile their once 
terrible names. Surrounded by the whites with their arts of civilization, 
which by destroying the resources of the savage doom him to weakness 
and decay…. That this fate surely awaits them if they remain within the 
limits of the States does not admit of a doubt.96 
 
Professing a concern for the increasingly dispossessed and subjugated tribes, Jackson 
warned of dangerous cultural destruction should the western tribes remain in the recently 
extended borders of the United States.  This dilemma necessitated a solution that came to 
define federal policy towards Native Americans for the next twenty years—Indian 
removal.  Jackson suggested “setting apart an ample district west of the Mississippi, and 
without the limits of any State or Territory now formed.”  He intended to guarantee “to 
the Indian tribes [that] as long as they shall occupy it,” each tribe would enjoy “a distinct 
                                                 
95 Charles J. Kappler, Indian Treaties, vol. 2, p. 202-203, 250-255. 
96 James D. Richardson, A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the 
Presidents (New York: Bureau of National Literature, 1897), p. 1005-1025. 
 106
control over the portion designated for its use.”97  The following year, the twenty-first 
convened Congress passed the Removal Act of 1830, effectively legislating and 
legalizing Jackson’s designs to push tribes across the Mississippi River. 
 Consistent with the new policy, William Clark met with Sauk and Fox Indians at 
Prairie du Chien where the Indians were pressured to surrender 26,500,000 acres east of 
the Mississippi in exchange for lands to the west.98  When Black Hawk, a Sauk Chief, 
refused to accept the terms of the treaty, a violent conflict erupted in Illinois.  Peaceful 
and hostile Kickapoos remained in the area and some of the latter joined in the Sauk 
resistance.  But the resistance did not last long and with the August 1832 defeat of Black 
Hawk on the Bad Axe River, the uprising ended.   Negotiating from a position of 
strength, the United States signed treaties with each of the tribes who formerly inhabited 
the region.   
The Kickapoos’ 1832 treaty represented the end of their last violent attempt to retain 
their traditional lands.  It further defined the terms of their new settlement in Missouri.  
The United States promised $18,000 in annuities, $12,000 of which was immediately 
distributed to the superintendent of Indian Affairs to manage supposed “debt of the said 
tribe.”  The treaty provided funds for blacksmiths and iron, the construction of a mill and 
a church, schools and educational supplies, farming tools, labor and improvement on 
lands, cattle, hogs, and other miscellaneous stock.  Most importantly, Kickapoos were to 
remove immediately. 
——— 
                                                 
97 Ibid. 
98 Charles J. Kappler, Indian Treaties, p. 182-183. 
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 Most of the Kickapoos gave into United States demands, migrating to Missouri as 
Euro-Americans occupied their former lands.  However, a large band did remain in 
Illinois under the leadership of Kenekuk, a pacifist Kickapoo Prophet.  Setters continued 
to surround the Illinois bands and overran the remaining territory east of the Mississippi.  
In 1810 Illinois’ Euro-American population was just over 7, 000, fairly equivalent to the 
Native population.  By 1820 the Euro-American population jumped to over 55,000.  By 
1830 some 157,000 Euro-Americans filled the state, and 476,000 arrived by 1840. 99  
 Though temporarily prospering during European conflict, and learning to extract 
resources from European powers anxious to win Indian allegiances, Kickapoos were 
unable to hold back the tides of Euro-American settlers and their military escort.  With 
the expulsion of competing European powers, Kickapoos could no longer make demands 
of the dominant or minor foreign powers.  Dispossessed of their land by settlers, military 
force, and legislation, the tribe’s entrenched system of diplomacy no longer functioned.  
Overwhelmed, the Kickapoos diplomatic strategy irreparably collapsed. 
 
                                                 
99 Third Census of the United States: Illinois Territory, 1810 (Springfield, Illinois: 
Archives Division, Illinois State Library, 1929), 59; Letter from the Secretary of State 
transmitting sundry documents relating to the inhabitants of the United States 
(Washington: Gales & Brayton, 1821), 18; Abstract of the Returns of the Fifth Census, 
Showing the number of free people, the number of slaves, the federal or representative 
number, and the aggregate of each country of each state of the United States 
(Washington: Duff Green, 1832), 36; Compendium of the Enumeration of the Inhabitants 
and Statistics of the United States, as obtained at the Department of State, from the 
Returns of the Sixth Census, by counties and principal towns, exhibiting the population, 
wealth, and resources of the country (Washington: Thomas Allen, 1841), p. 86. 
Epilogue 
 
When Father Claude Allouez, Jacques Marquette, and Louis Joliet first met the 
Kickapoos, the Europeans found little to distinguish the tribe from other Indian nations 
living in the Great Lakes region.  Over three and a half centuries later, the tribe is still 
overshadowed in textbooks, library shelves, and Internet web pages by their Iroquoian 
and Siouan neighbors.  Euro-centric history emphasizes the nations that contributed to 
European wars and empires, culminating in the establishment and growth of the United 
State of America.  Smaller tribes, and those who resist simple categorization into French, 
British, or United States alliances, are sparsely discussed in historical narratives.  
Regardless of historiographical oversight, the Kickapoos’ experiences illustrate 
alternative roles played by Native peoples.  Concerned with their own complex 
motivations, Kickapoos navigated their changing political environment.   
From the earliest records, it seems Kickapoos dynamically adapted to evolving 
international situations.  Unable to repel neither the invading Sioux from the west nor 
Iroquois from the east, Kickapoos migrated southward from present-day Wisconsin into 
the Illinois River Valley.  There they managed alliances and displaced local tribes, 
gradually asserting themselves as the dominant nation in the region.  As French 
explorers, clergy, and traders penetrated the Great Lakes and ventured southwest from 
Lake Michigan, the Kickapoos met them with indifference.  But from the mid-17th to the 
mid-18th century, Kickapoo treatment of the French underwent a series of changes.  After 
a short period of indifference, Kickapoos met the newcomers with hostility.  Unable to 
overtly challenge French authority, the tribe adopted a cooperative attitude that quickly 
slipped into loyalty. 
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 By the mid-18th century, British merchants provided an alternative to French 
traders.  Anticipating defeat in the French and Indian War, France ceded Louisiana to 
Spain, providing Kickapoos with a third European neighbor.  Claiming fidelity to all 
three, the Kickapoos exploited each European nation for gifts, trade, and services, while 
simultaneously raiding and repelling permanent settlements encroaching upon their 
Illinois homeland.  The tribe took advantage of European rivalries and seized 
opportunities to extend its own territorial dominion.  All the while, European nations 
were kept at bay by a strange balance of pretended loyalty and aggressive raids against 
uninvited foreigners.  Indeed, duplicitous extortion characterized Kickapoo diplomacy 
from 1750 to 1780. 
 As the United States won independence, foreign powers gradually withdrew and 
the “Long Knives” extended their sovereignty over the Old Northwest.  Legislation and 
settlement, empowered by successful military campaigns, enabled the United States to 
exert control in the region.  From 1791 to 1794, U.S. armies and militias overwhelmed 
the Ohio Country and eventually forced the Treaty of Greenville, opening present-day 
Ohio to Euro-American settlement.  In 1803 France sold Louisiana to the United States, 
stripping the Kickapoos who remained in the Northwest of a European supporter.  The 
War of 1812 likewise isolated the Kickapoos as the British withdrew from posts in the 
Old Northwest.  Without foreign supporters, Kickapoos were unable to resist Euro-
American settlers under military escort.  Signing two treaties in 1819, the Kickapoos’ 
subjugation was formally spelled out as the tribe accepted the United States as its 
“protector” and surrendered relationships with other nations.  The Kickapoos’ diplomatic 
system could no longer function. 
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Again facing a changing political environment, the Kickapoos splintered 
along divergent strategies for managing the new diplomatic world.  Hostile Kickapoos, 
unable to challenge U.S. military might, migrated out of Illinois, shattering across the 
West.  Some went to the new reservation in present-day Missouri, and later relocated to 
present-day Oklahoma; others migrated southwest, joining the Spanish Kickapoo bands 
in Texas and Coahuila, Mexico; still others peacefully resisted removal organizing under 
Kennekuk, the Kickapoo prophet.  William Clark regularly negotiated with this pacifist 
leader, fruitlessly attempting to force the remaining Kickapoos into present-day Missouri.  
Finally, in 1832 the Kickapoos agreed to move onto lands near Fort Leavenworth, where 
some of their descendants remain today.  Meanwhile the Missouri Kickapoos ran into 
conflict with their assigned neighbors and long time enemies, the Osages, inciting 
additional migrations to Oklahoma and Coahuila.  Along with Lipan Apaches, Mexican 
Kickapoos conducted cross-border raids into Texas until 1870’s when United States 
military interventions ended the attacks and forcefully repatriated half the Mexican 
Kickapoos to Oklahoma.  Thereafter migrating between Oklahoma and Coahuila, the 
Kickapoos established a band in Eagle Pass, Texas.   
Today, significant Kickapoo populations reside in Kansas, Oklahoma, Texas, and 
Coahuila, while smaller groups can be found in Arizona and throughout the American 
West.  Those in Kansas are concerned with landfill maintenance, reclamation, and the 
preservation of their agricultural economy.  Those in Texas are rapidly transitioning from 
poverty and life in sheet-metal wickiups under the U.S.-Mexico International Bridge to 
wealth management following the 1996 opening of a reservation casino and the recent 
acquisition of tribal acreage.  Kickapoos in Oklahoma remain culturally conservative and 
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generally isolated, attempting to retain pre-contact lifestyles but struggling to find 
access to traditional resources.  Hunting dear out of season and salvaging cattail reeds has 
caused conflict with the Oklahoma state government, and more widely shared issues of 
poverty stemming from a decreasing land base continue to perpetuate tribal concerns.  
Last, the Kickapoos in Mexico have spent nearly 200 years under a completely different 
government whose policies have generally ignored the tribe, allowing the band to sustain 
traditional practices.  However, mid-20th century Mexican enclosure movements and 
unsustainable hunting forced the Mexican Kickapoos to seek alternative methods of 
cultural and land preservation over the past fifty years.  Many now labor as migrant 
workers, providing transient labor in the western United States during the harvest season 
but reside in the reclusive Nacimiento northern Mexican village for the remaining year.   
Kickapoos early diplomatic experiences are significant for a variety of reasons, 
but perhaps none more than their usefulness as a model of adaptation and conflict 
management.  Facing a changing international environment that was increasingly hostile 
to the tribe’s preservation, Kickapoos forged their own identities independent of the 
designs of their would-be “father” nations.  Whether engaging the French, British, 
Spanish or Euro-Americans, Kickapoos resisted the control of foreign powers and 
redefined their strategies resiliently to survive and prosper.  The expansion of the United 
States certainly had an immeasurably enormous impact on the Kickapoos and other 
indigenous peoples, but Kickapoos remain one example of how individual tribes actively 
managed those pressures.  Indeed, the Kickapoos remain the authors of their own 
destinies.   
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